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With the merger of judicial supervision and mandated treatment, drug courts have
given rise to therapeutic jurisprudence and attempt to address those issues which have
plagued corrections policymakers for several decades. The evaluation literature indicates
that drug courts tend to produce lower recidivism rates, increased retention rates and
lower costs when compared to traditional programs. However, as drug courts approach
their second decade, there is a void in the literature regarding the implementation of drug
court programs.
This study specifically examined those factors which either facilitate or challenge
the implementation of drug court programs. This study examined implementation issues
from a bottom-up and top-down perspective. In order to examine these issues, the
perceptions of drug court judges and administrators in five states were obtained through
the administration of a survey instrument.
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Examination of the influence of government factors upon the implementation of
drug court programs yielded interesting findings. A host of factors appear to influence
the implementation of drug court programs, including federal, state and local agencies
and actors. Respondents consistently identified state and local actors as being the most
supportive and influential of the efforts to create and implement drug courts. Of those,
the most common actors were public defenders and the district attorneys. If opposition to
drug courts existed, the respondents indicated that local law enforcement or the general
public were generally the sources of the opposition. In addition, there is clearly a more
positive view of the influence of state and local actors when compared to their federal
counterparts.
From a policy perspective, the results of this research reveal that innovative
programs for criminal offenders can thrive in conservative states. Four states in the
sample are southern states with Utah being the only non-southern state, yet one which is
typically regarded as conservative in terms of social policy and political values. Despite
the conservative character of these states, drug court programs are thriving. Moreover,
actors and agencies within these states appear supportive of innovative programming
within the criminal justice system which is markedly different from the traditional
approaches supported by conservatives.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The evolution of American drug control policy has undergone several remarkable
phases; all of which are instrumental to understand current policies and strategies to
combat the use and abuse of drugs as well as drug-related crime. However, most
instrumental to the present study is the dramatic increases in crime and the high costs of
incarceration which plagued policymakers in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.
Especially troubling for policymakers was the continued and alarming increase in the
sheer number of drug-related crimes. While the link between drugs and crime has been
well-documented among criminal justice professionals, national rates of drug-related
crimes continued to escalate leaving policymakers searching for creative and costeffective strategies to deal with ever-increasing dockets and prison populations.
However, political forces demanded policies which were “tough on crime” and therefore
required policymakers to favor programs which offered accountability and deterrence.
Drug courts seemed to offer a palatable alternative. Drug courts target a very
specific, yet growing offender population which accounts for a significant percentage of
prison populations. With the merger of judicial supervision and mandated treatment,
drug courts address those issues which have plagued corrections policymakers for several
decades. Those who desire policies which are tough on crime are impressed with the
1

strict accountability required by drug courts while others who believe the proper focus of
the justice system should be rehabilitation are encouraged by the prevailing emphasis on
drug treatment. Thus, drug courts seem to be an alternative which satisfies both
conservative and positivist factions.

Statement of the Problem
The initial report on drug courts is encouraging. The evaluation literature on drug
courts is plentiful with most evaluations revealing promising results. Impact and process
evaluations indicate that drug courts tend to produce lower recidivism rates, increased
retention rates and lower costs when compared to traditional programs such as probation.
However, as drug courts approach their second decade, there is a void in the literature
regarding the implementation of drug court programs which leaves a central question left
unanswered: What factors have influenced the implementation of drug court programs? 1
This study specifically examines the implementation of drug court programs.
Unlike projects which focus on the implementation of regulatory policy (See Ringquist,
1993) where program compliance is mandatory, this project examines the implementation
of a creative policy alternative the use of which is within the discretion of the local
jurisdiction. Moreover, this study examines implementation issues from a bottom-up and
top-down perspective (see Matland, 1995; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989; Hjern, 1982;
Hjern and Hull, 1985, 1987). On a broader scale, the proposed project will provide
scholars and policymakers with relevant information regarding those factors which
1

Lawrence and Freeman (2002) authored a report regarding the implementation of Australia’s first drug
court program. However, this article is largely descriptive in nature and presents an overview of
Australia’s first drug court program as opposed to an examination of those factors which influenced the
implementation.
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facilitate and challenge the implementation of drug court programs. As a result, this
study augments the existing literature on drug courts which is currently dominated by
outcome and process evaluations of drug court programs. The current study is designed
to address the following research questions:
1. What factors influence the implementation of drug court programs in the
United States?
2. Whether top-down or bottom-up factors are more likely to influence the
successful implementation of drug court programs in the United States?

Theoretical Justification and Framework for Analysis
According to Thomas Dye, “public policy is whatever the government chooses to
do or not to do” (Dye, 1981: 1). How these decisions are made by “government” is a
dynamic process which often proves elusive to traditional methods of examination and
measurement. However, it is generally agreed that the evolution of crime policy and
more specifically drug policy, is a function of the “… confluence of media, ideology and
politics” (Merlo and Benekos, 2004: 169). Interestingly, the dynamic nature of crime
policy over the last century is evidence of the cyclic policy pattern discussed by
Archambeault and Archambeault (1982).
What has occurred is referred to as a “perturbated spiral compression” model
of policy change (Archambeault and Archambeault, 1982: 158-160). In this model, five
stages of policy evolution occur. During these stages, “new ideas emerge, reach a point
of maximum impact, begin to decline and then become integrated into collective
knowledge” (Merlo and Benekos, 2004: 169). In the final stage, “reconceptualized and
3

redefined ideas reemerge and the cycle continues” (Merlo and Benekos, 2004, 169;
Archambeault and Archambeault, 1982: 158-160). The authors coined the term
perturbated spiral compression to refer to the irregularity of the process (perturbated); its
continuous nature (spiral); and the speed with which the transformation occurs
(compression) (Merlo and Benekos, 2004, 169; Archambeault and Archambeault, 1982,
158-160).
According to Cohen (1985,35), “the problems, inconsistencies, contradictions and
unintended consequences of crime control policies provide opponents with a rationale to
begin dismantling and replacing discredited and bankrupt policy.” Thus, the work of
Armchambeault and Archambeault (1982) is useful when examining the evolution of
crime policy because such frameworks allow us to view the impact of competing
ideology and theory upon policy change (Merlo and Benekos, 2004, 169). Because drug
control policy has largely been developed under the auspices of crime policy, the
Archambeault model is a useful conceptualization.
A similar view of policy change is that advocated by Sabatier (1988). At its core,
the theoretical framework constructed by Sabatier (1988) is an attempt to expand on the
earlier work of Heclo (1974). The primary modification to the conceptualization of
policy change by Sabatier (1988) is the addition of factors related to political belief
systems, political coalitions, policy implementation and the use of policy analysis
(Sabatier, 1988, 340, fn. 1). The framework posited by Sabatier (1988) is comprised of
three basic premises. First, a decade or more is required to fully understand policy
change and the role of policy-oriented learning. Second, policy change is best
understood by an examination of “policy subsystems.” Policy subsystems are defined by
4

Sabatier (1988, 341) as “the interaction of actors from different institutions interested in a
policy arena.” Importantly, policy subsystems include both public and private actors
involved with the policy. The final premise of the Sabatier model allows public policy
“…to be conceptualized in the same manner as belief systems” (Sabatier, 1988, 341).
With these three premises in mind, Sabatier (1988) suggests that policy change
occurs when policy subsystems (with their policy beliefs and resources) act as advocacy
coalitions for those beliefs and seek to transform the same into public policy. However, a
key component of the subsystem is the policy broker. Policy brokers are typically third
parties who are not members of the policy coalition but “whose dominant concern is with
keeping the level of political conflict within acceptable limits and with reaching some
‘reasonable’ solution to the problem” (Sabatier, 1988, 351).
In addition, the Sabatier (1988) model incorporates variables which represent the
opportunities and constraints which impact the policy subsystem actors. These include
“relatively stable system parameters” and “external system events.” (Sabatier, 1988,
342). Relatively stable system parameters include the basic attributes of the problem
area, basic distribution of natural resources, fundamental socio-cultural values and social
structure and lastly, the basic constitutional structure (rules) (Sabatier, 1988, 342).
External system events (perturbations) are more dynamic in nature and include changes
in socio-economic conditions, changes in systemic governing coalition and policy
decisions and impacts from other subsystems (Sabatier, 1988, 342). Depending upon the
impact of stable system parameters or external events, policy coalitions may revise or
modify their strategy to maximize the likelihood of policy change which reflects their
core beliefs.
5

A key element of the Sabatier (1988) model is policy-oriented learning. This
concept is attributed to Heclo (1974, 304) and is more specifically described as
“relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioral intentions which result from
experience and which are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy
objectives” (Sabatier, 1988, 343). Policy-oriented learning is a result of perception of
external dynamics as well as increased knowledge of the problem and factors which
affects that problem (Sabatier, 1988, 343). Thus, the intersection of increased policy
knowledge and external events often result in policy advocates shifting their focus and
strategy.
The relevance of Sabatier’s model to an examination of the evolution of American
drug control policy is evident. For decades, advocacy groups have debated whether the
drug control problem was an issue that required a criminal justice response or a social
and rehabilitative response. These groups have each sought policy which would
implement their core policy beliefs. Following years of tough laws and the War on Drugs
which have resulting in revolving prison doors, overcrowded prisons and a mammoth
price tag, drug control policies are now beginning to incorporate programming which
includes both accountability and treatment. Drug courts are an example of drug control
programs which represent a shift from the law and order response to all drug offenders.
While the Sabatier (1988) model is designed to provide a framework from which
to examine policy change, the literature also provides substantial guidance on the
examination of policy implementation and outcomes. A useful synthesis of the
implementation literature is authored by Richard Matland (1995) wherein he thoroughly
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reviewed the existing implementation literature which has been dominated by two views:
top-down and bottom-up.
Top-down implementation analysis suggests that policy success or failure should
be evaluated in light of compliance with an authoritative directive such as a statutory
mandate (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981, 1983, 1989).
Thus, top-down analysts focus on the authoritative directive and view implementation as
a function of the degree to which that directive addresses the problem as well as the
manner in which the problem will be addressed. In one of the most-often cited models of
top-down policy implementation, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1989) suggest that policy
implementation is largely determined by three categories of factors. These are:
tractability (solvability) of the problem, ability of the statute to structure implementation
and nonstatutory variables which affect implementation. However, the primary criticisms
of top-down approaches are the lack of attention to microlevel factors and the role of
street-level actors and politics in the implementation process (Matland, 1995, 147).
In contrast, bottom-up approaches focus on the actions of street-level actors and
the impact those individuals and their beliefs, goals and activities have on policy
implementation. Thus, bottom-up approaches are most concerned with microlevel
implementation. According to Matland (1995), “…bottom-uppers have placed more
emphasis on describing what factors have caused difficulty [or facilitate] in reaching
stated goals” (Matland, 1995, 149). The scholarship of Hjern (1982) and Hjern and Hull
(1985; 1987) is most closely associated with the bottom-up perspective. Hjern (1982)
suggests beginning with the beliefs, functions and role of street-level actors when
developing a plan for policy implementation. Such a method will provide a functional
7

analysis of implementation along with the challenges which may present themselves.
Such an approach also is more likely to accommodate community needs and challenges.
Following review of the prevailing approaches to policy implementation, Matland
(1995) attempts to create a comprehensive model which utilizes the level of policy
ambiguity and conflict as its benchmark. The hallmark of the Matland model is the
ambiguity-conflict matrix for policy implementation processes. These include
administrative implementation (low conflict, low ambiguity); political implementation
(high conflict, low ambiguity); experimental implementation (low conflict, high
ambiguity) and lastly, symbolic implementation (high conflict, high ambiguity). Within
each type of implementation, a factor which is primarily responsible for successful
implementation is identified. In administrative implementation, implementation is
largely dependent upon resources. However, if the policy requires political
implementation, it is dependent upon power. Experimental implementation is dependent
upon contextual conditions and symbolic implementation upon coalition strength
(Matland, 1995).
In its broadest form, American drug control policy appears to fall within the
category of political implementation. Most policy elites and the general public share
core beliefs about drug control policy: the need to eradicate the use of illegal drugs and
crime associated with drug use. However, there is a significant amount of conflict among
advocacy groups, political parties and the public regarding the means through which this
policy goal should be accomplished. Because actors who may not share similar beliefs
about the policy must be relied upon for implementation of the policy, those who support
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the policy must either have sufficient power to force their will on others or be able to
accomplish their goals through bargaining and compromise (Matland, 1995).
The political nature of policy implementation is embraced by Mazmanian and
Sabatier (1989) in their model. This model includes variables which address general
public support, support from upper-level political leaders, resources and support from
relevant constituency groups and the commitment of implementing officials (Mazmanian
and Sabatier (1989) in Matland, 1995, 165).
However, when one considers the more specific inquiry, i.e. the use of drug
treatment courts as a novel intervention technique, the categorization under Matland’s
model (1995) appears to shift. As a result of this shift, the choice of perspective from
which to evaluate implementation does as well. When drug courts are viewed as an
extension of the larger area of drug control policy, the categorization of this policy area
lies within experimental implementation.
At the outset, Matland (1995) suggests that high policy ambiguity and low policy
conflict are the criteria for experimental implementation. However, upon further reading,
Matland (1995) acknowledges that “…policies with clear and widely supported goals but
with unclear means of implementation take on experimental characteristics” (Matland,
1995, 167). 2 Such description reflects that which attends the use of drug treatment
courts. The policies and statutory guidelines which attend the use of drug treatment
courts are relatively clear, yet these policies clearly comprehend a healthy respect for
2

Matland (1995) utilizes the Headstart Program as an example of experimental policy implementation.
According to Matland (1995), the Office of Economic Opportunity possessed very general ideas regarding
Headstart programming. As such, proposals with significant diversity were approved and funded. With
time, however, goals of Headstart programming gained clarity and the program more structured. However,
the ambiguous nature at the inception of Headstart resulted in tremendous power and control at the local
level.
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local conditions, resources and actors. While the underlying components and goals of
drug courts are well-defined and consistent, a great degree of flexibility exists in the
manner in which these are implemented. As a result, programs vary among and within
states. According to Matland (1995), when implementation in this context is examined, a
bottom-up model, with its greater “tolerance for ambiguity,” is most appropriate
(Matland, 1995, 167).
The use of the bottom-up perspective is also implicated by Maynard-Moody,
Musheno and Palumbo (1990) in their examination of street-level influence and the
successful implementation of community corrections programs. Maynard-Moody, et al.
(1990) acknowledge the traditional criticisms of street-level influence on public policy,
but suggest that the “…positive aspects of street-level influence can be maximized and
the negative aspects minimized when service organizations are designed to engage, rather
than mute, street-level worker perspectives on how policy should be implemented”
(Maynard-Moody, et al. 1990, 833). The authors rely on the earlier work of Lipsky
(1980) where he argued that street-level workers were the “ultimate policy makers”
because they determine the “distribution and character of governmental benefits and
sanctions”(Lipsky, 1980, 3-12 in Maynard-Moody, et al. 1990, 834).
The work of Maynard-Moody, et al. (1990) is relevant to this project given the
similarity between community corrections (characterized by the authors as the provision
of human services, including vocational training, job skills, drug and alcohol treatment
and family counseling) to qualified offenders through the work activities of street-level
employees (Maynard-Moody, et al., 1990, 836). In light of the significant amount of
discretion which exists among street-level employees, Maynard-Moody, et al., (1990)
10

suggest that community corrections is an appropriate milieu for an examination of the
street-level workers and the implementation of social policy (Maynard-Moody, et al.,
1990, 836).
In light of the foregoing, both top-down and bottom-up variables are relevant to
the issues under examination. As such, the proposed project will utilized a combined
approach and examine the impact of top-down and bottom-up variables on the
implementation of drug court programs. Such an approach is intended to better
understand the full range of variables which influence the continuing development of an
extremely popular correctional alternative.
This approach with its inclusion of both top-down and bottom-up variables yields
the following model:

11
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Scope and Limitations of Study
The present study is an attempt to examine those variables which impact the
successful implementation of drug courts. As described more fully in Chapter 3, this
project utilized a survey instrument to examine the perceptions of drug court success held
by drug court judges and administrators. Drug court programs in five states were
selected for inclusion based on a number of substantive criteria as well as the availability
of accurate mailing lists for drug court programs. With the exception of Utah, the
remaining states included in the study are from the South. As such, there is concern due
12

to the experiences which may (or may not) be unique to drug court judges or
administrators in southern states thus giving rise to a regional bias. In addition, it
becomes difficult to generalize the findings of this project to drug court judges and
administrators throughout the country.
In addition, the study relies on the perceptions of the respondents. Many
researchers have explored the risks and benefits of data based on perception (Saltzman, et
al., 1982). While there are limitations to such data, the instant study utilized drug court
judges and administrators who are most familiar with the actual performance of the drug
court program. Moreover, effort was made to structure survey items to specifically
examine more concrete measures such as the actual actions taken by various actors in an
effort to minimize those issues which arise with perception data. However, it is
acknowledged that perceptions are fluid and therefore may change following the
administration of the survey instrument. This study, as with all that rely on self-report
surveys, must assume that the respondents are truthful.

13

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

The Evolution of American Drug Control Policy
The academic discourse on the history of American drug control policy typically
begins with the first drug control policies which were enacted in 1900. Prior to that time,
narcotics and other substances were virtually unregulated by the government. Thus,
narcotics and other substances could be obtained and used without recourse. For
example, heroin or cocaine were both widely available and usually available for purchase
from drugstores or the like (Reiman, 2004; Duster, 1970). Given its widespread
availability, recreational drug use was “socially acceptable” (Roman, et al., 2004; Musto,
1999).
According to Roman, et al. (2004) “the use and abuse of psychoactive substances
other than alcohol became prevalent during the Civil War” (Roman, et al. 2004, 36).
This was attributed largely to the widespread use of morphine to treat injured soldiers.
However, following treatment, many soldiers suffered from the long-term addiction.
While morphine and other forms of opiates reigned supreme for many years, in 1884 the
medicinal value of cocaine as an anesthetic became apparent. However, cocaine, like
opiates, possessed strong addictive properties. Yet, despite its dangers, cocaine, too, was
widely available for recreational use and was likewise socially acceptable. Most
14

remember the use of cocaine in Coca-Cola products, hence the popular advertising
slogan: “The Real Thing.” However, the dangers associated with the widespread use and
abuse of drugs eventually became apparent.
In the late 1800’s communities and families began to struggle with the
consequences of physical and psychological addiction to these substances. These
struggles coupled with the increasing need for a sober work force to satisfy the demands
of the Industrial Revolution resulted in a new awareness and a national discussion
regarding control and enforcement. However, the guiding perspective for this discussion
was one of treatment, not punishment. Society hoped that government regulation would
produce meaningful policy to combat what was initially viewed as a disease that was
beyond the control of the addict. However, the primary response to the problem by the
medical community was the development of “. . .new drugs which could counter the
addictive properties of narcotics” (Roman, et al., 2004, 36). Unfortunately, this approach
resulted in the addition of new addictive substances to the market (Roman, et al., 2004,
36). Thus, addicts may have shifted from one substance to another but were not
receiving treatment which eliminated their need for alcohol or drugs.
With the passage of time, however, the public sentiment towards drug use and
addiction began to shift from the view that addiction was a medical problem to the view
that addiction was essentially a psychological and moral issue (Roman, et al., 2004, 36).
According to MacCoun and Reuter (2001), this new model linked substance abuse with
social deviance. Moreover, this shift in perspective suggested that addiction should be
viewed as a lapse in moral fiber, self control and pathology as opposed to a physiological
disease. The new perspective encouraged the belief that addiction was within the control
15

of the individual. Such a shift would therefore have distinctive implications for future
drug control policies (Roman, et al., 2004, 36; Nolan, 2001).
Following the election of Theodore Roosevelt in 1901, the federal government
began to gradually address the problem of substance abuse. The first step occurred with
the appointment of a national anti-narcotics advisor followed by the development and
implementation of a public awareness campaign to educate the public regarding the
dangers of drug abuse (Roman, et al., 2004, 37). With the commitment of the executive
branch readily apparent, Congress also began to work on legislation which would
effectively address the proliferation of narcotics and other substances. The next two
decades would mark a period of increasing federal involvement in the sale and
distribution and use of narcotics and other drugs.
The 1906 Food and Drug Act is widely identified as the first significant piece
of federal legislation designed to regulate the distribution of certain substances.
However, the Food and Drug Act did not significantly impact the drug trade. Rather, this
Act simply required manufacturers to label their products with a label which listed all
ingredients.
Eight years later, Congress enacted the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act. Unlike its
predecessor, the Harrison Act (1914) implemented more stringent controls on the
distribution of certain substances and is commonly referred to as the first national antidrug legislation (Roman et al., 2004, 37). While the Act did not prohibit the manufacture
or distribution of any particular substance, it made the following sweeping changes: 1)
imposed registration requirements for both narcotic distributors and consumers; 2)
imposed a tax upon the sale of narcotics; 3) imposed limits on the amount of narcotics
16

that could be sold; 4) required prescriptions for the distribution of narcotics; and 5)
limited the use of narcotics to medical purposes (Roman, 2004, 37-38; MacCoun and
Reuter, 2001).
In 1919, the focus shifted from narcotics to alcohol with the passage of the
Volstead Act. The Act was subsequently adopted as the Eighteenth Amendment to the
Constitution and prohibited the manufacturing, sale, import and export of alcohol. This
era is commonly referred to as Prohibition and is typically portrayed as an era with an
elaborate underground network of night clubs and bootleggers all designed to circumvent
law enforcement efforts and deliver alcohol to a deprived public. According to Roman,
et al. (2004), the passage of the Volstead Act marked the beginning of a trend which
continues to today: the institutional separation of drugs and alcohol within national drug
policy. Also, interesting is the difference in response. Alcohol tends to reap a more
treatment-oriented legislative response whereas narcotics tend to receive a more punitive
one (Roman, et al., 2004, 39).
Another pivotal and influential event occurred in 1930 with the appointment of
Harry J. Anslinger as the Commissioner of Narcotics, a position within the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics. Commissioner Anslinger served throughout five presidential
administrations (1930-1962). Interestingly, federal drug policy mirrored the Anslinger
philosophy regarding drug use. Anslinger believed that drug use was a form of voluntary
deviance and therefore sought and recommended policies which provided a conservative
approach to the problem: criminalization, detection, enforcement and incarceration.
Thus, the next three decades brought legislation which was increasingly punitive and not
treatment-oriented (Roman, et al., 2004, 36; Musto and Korsmeyer, 2002).
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In 1937, Congress enacted the Marihuana Tax Act. Following the trend which
was emerging among the states, the federal government prohibited the non-medicinal
(and untaxed) possession of marijuana. Violations were punished with fines and/or
incarceration. Medicinal and certain industrial uses were exempt from the Act and
subject to a special occupational tax.
A year later, Congress passed the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (1938). This
legislation designated the issue of drug safety to the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). Additionally, the Act defined drugs as any substance which affects the body in
the absence of disease and implemented a system of classification of drugs.
During the 1940s, Congress enacted the Opium Poppy Control Act (1942) and the
Narcotics Act (1946). The Opium Poppy Control Act was an attempt to regulate
synthetic forms of opium and cocaine whereas the Narcotics Act significantly increased
penalties for the illegal distribution of narcotics.
The 1950s resulted in even greater federal attention to the national drug problem.
In 1951, the Harrison Act was amended with the passage of the Boggs Act. The Boggs
Act continued a continuing trend of punitive measures designed to curb supply of and
demand for narcotics. This legislation instituted a mandatory minimum graduated
sentencing scheme for drug-related convictions. Sentences ranged from 2 to 5 years for
first offenses to 10 to 20 years for third or subsequent offenses. The Boggs Act was
followed by the Durham-Humphrey Amendment in 1951 which created guidelines for
prescription drugs. The Narcotics Control Act of 1956 provided additional penalties for
violations of narcotics laws, including the death penalty in cases where narcotics were
sold to minors. This Act also authorized federal narcotics agents to carry firearms.
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While national drug control policy was becoming increasingly more punitive
throughout the 1950s the nation was entering into one of the most unusual social periods
in history: the 1960s. This period was marked by the Civil Rights Movement, Equal
Rights for Women and the War in Vietnam. Troubled by the punitive measures
contained in the Boggs Act, the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American
Medical Association (AMA) formed a joint committee to examine the national approach
to drug use and formulate recommendations. Following an examination of international
approaches and the national experience, the committee recommended a less punitive
treatment-oriented approach to drug abuse and drug-related crime.
The work of the AMA/ABA joint committee marked the beginning of a decade
during which reexamination of national drug policy was encouraged. In the year1962,
President Kennedy held a national conference which was designed to solicit suggestions
to improve the response to drug use. Suggestions were focused on rehabilitation and
greater coordination among federal agencies involved with the implementation of
national drug policy.
1962 also included the occurrence of two other pivotal events. First, 1962 marked
the end of Harry Anslinger’s tenure as the Commissioner of Narcotics. Second, the
judiciary handed down an opinion which clearly reflected an appreciation of the unique
dynamics of drug addiction. Robinson v. California (1962) involved a due process
challenge to a California statute which criminalized narcotics addiction. Following
review, the United States Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to criminalize
the addiction. To do so, in the opinion of the Court, was criminalization of a status rather
than the criminalization of illegal conduct. Interestingly, the opinion clearly embraced
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the view of narcotics addiction as a disease. The shift continued with the passage of the
Narcotic Addict and Rehabilitation Act of 1966 which authorized the use of drug
treatment facilities as alternatives to incarceration (Roman, et al. 2004; Nolan, 2001;
Keel, 1993).
Following the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the nation continued to entertain
treatment-oriented and rehabilitative policy alternatives. Thus, officially, the country was
open to examination of not only its drug policy but to its traditional response to crime as
well. The debate over the origins and solutions to crime and drugs proved to be an
important subject in the 1964 Johnson-Goldwater Presidential campaign (Rosch, 1985).
The contrast in approaches occurred along traditional lines epitomized the ongoing
debate about the causes of crime and the appropriate responses.
Goldwater, a Republican, argued that crime was “the result of a weakened
morality and a decline in discipline” (Marion, 1995, 95). Like other conservatives,
Goldwater’s solutions included more police with greater authority and discretion coupled
with tougher laws (Marion, 1995). Interestingly, Goldwater favored a strong federal role
in the business of criminal justice and law enforcement (Marion, 1995, 96). Goldwater’s
views reflected the classical approach to crime with its focus on free will, rational choice,
deterrence and punishment.
On the other hand, Johnson, a Democrat, viewed crime as a social issue with
social causes. Like Goldwater, Johnson also favored a strong federal presence to assist
with crime reduction. However, the function of the federal government would be
prevention, treatment and rehabilitation. Moreover, Johnson “focused his crime
campaign on defining the root causes of crime and using the government to develop
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programs to correct them” (Merlo and Benekos, 2004, 161). Johnson’s beliefs were
clearly more in line with positivist notions of criminal behavior and its emphasis on the
discovery of those factors in the environment which adversely impact human behavior.
Once causes are discovered, the positivist model favors corrective action which is
rehabilitative and able to promote pro-social behavior.
Following the heated campaign, Johnson was elected President and soon began
work on his approach to the increasing problems associated with rising crime rates. In
July of 1965, President Lyndon Johnson, by executive order, established the President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The purpose of the
Commission was to investigate the causes and nature of crime, to collect existing
knowledge about the criminal justice system and to make recommendations which
address how the criminal justice system may meet the “challenge of crime in a free
society.” According to Johnson, “crime is a social problem that is deeply interwoven
with almost every aspect of American life.” (President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967, pg. vi, all quotes).
The Commission’s report was presented to President Johnson in 1967 and focused
on the social and economic variables which influence crime. In its report, the
Commission recognized that the rate of violent crime in the United States was
particularly troubling. The Commission attributed rising crime rates to the existence of
social inequalities that went beyond poverty and unemployment. Rather, the
Commission suggested that “[t]he social institutions generally relied on to guide and
control people in their individual and mutual existence simply are not operating
effectively in the inner city.” The Commission called for “every effort” to be made to
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“strengthen the family.” According to the Commission, the most important objective for
the country was to “seek to prevent crime before it happens by assuring that all
Americans have a stake in the benefits and responsibilities of American life.” In addition
to its attention to the root causes of crime, the Commission addressed the widespread use
of incarceration as a response. The Commission acknowledged that correctional facilities
did not achieve their rehabilitative goals and more often returned individuals who were
no better-equipped to meet their responsibilities upon their return to society. Thus, the
Commission strongly urged that the correctional system shift its focus “toward the
integration of offenders into community life” (President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967, pg. vi, all quotes).
Armed with an increased sensibility to the need for rehabilitative orientation and
programming, the 1970s resulted in a decade marked by legislation which increased
funding for treatment and education. However, Congress continued its emphasis on
enforcement and detection of criminal drug activity. This was apparent when, in 1970,
Congress, with the support of the Nixon administration, enacted the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse and Control Act. This Act was intended to address the distribution of illegal
narcotics in a comprehensive manner and was designed to replace all previous legislation
regarding narcotics. Despite the shift towards rehabilitation and treatment throughout the
1960s, the Act further limited narcotics dosages and authorized more severe prison
sentences for drug violations. However, the Act did reduce federal penalties for
possession of marijuana.
Two years later, Congress enacted the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act
(1972). This Act was more in line with prevailing thought with its provision of federal
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funding for programs which emphasized prevention and treatment. Additional funding
was approved in the 1978 amendments to this legislation.
In 1973, Congress reorganized federal agencies which were largely responsible
for the formulation and implementation of national drug policy. Congress established the
Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) which was a
consolidation of the former National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), the National
Institute for Drug Addiction (NIDA) and the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism (NIAAA). The newly-created Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was
a new version of the former Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
The late 1970s and early 1980s were marked by legislation which continued
federal funding for education, prevention and treatment strategies. In 1978, Congress
passed the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Education amendments which created educational
programs to be administered by the Department of Education. In 1980, further funding
was allocated in the Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation amendments
and in 1984, Congress established programming and treatment for drug offenders in the
Drug Offenders Act.
Despite the gains in programming and funding, a shift in public sentiment
regarding crime that had been steadily growing throughout the 1970s was about to
transform the national approach to crime and drugs. This shift is referred to by many
scholars and policy analysts as the “conservative revolution” (Currie, 1990). The essence
of the conservative revolution was the view that crime was a criminal justice problem,
not a social one. According to Currie (1990) this perspective had “dethroned social
explanations of the causes of crime, cast the idea of the rehabilitation of offenders into
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the category of the antique and faintly disreputable, relegated the belief that social
programs might help prevent crime to the margins of public discourse, and
simultaneously elevated the idea that crime could be best reduced by deterrence and
incapacitation to a central place in public policy” (Currie, 1990, 53). Proponents viewed
the surge in crime rates as a function of the “absence of sufficient punishment.” (Currie,
1990, 53). The conservative revolution was fueled, in part, by the argument that despite a
decades-long emphasis on rehabilitation, crime rates continued to escalate and prisons
were now overcrowded. Thus, conservatives argued that the rehabilitative approach to
crime had not worked and the focus on treatment as opposed to sufficient punishment had
in fact allowed violent crime, drugs and gangs to proliferate.
According to Merlo and Benkos (2004: 169), the shift is largely attributed to the
following developments: (1) the discrediting of rehabilitation as a goal of criminal
justice—a media message that “nothing works,” (2) the view of criminals as free-willed
individuals making rational decisions to commit crime—a shift in the ideology of crime
and (3) the emphasis on public safety and victims’ rights rather than concerns with
offenders’ rights—politics and politicization of crime. Thus, the shift in sentiment was
“a confluence of media, ideology and politics” (Merlo and Benekos, 2004, 169).
As such, the 1980s brought with it a strong “law and order” response to crime as
well as the firm entrenchment of the war model. The war metaphor was especially
persuasive with the public and provided a useful framework within which to present the
law and order approach to crime. The Reagan administration embraced the war model
and marked an approach to crime which possessed all of the hallmarks of the traditional
conservative response: tougher penalties for crime, the continued use of incarceration as
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the primary weapon against crime and tough anti-crime federal legislation. Moreover,
during the Reagan years, states began enacting mandatory minimum sentencing schemes,
eliminating parole for many types of offenders, increasing the types of offenses for which
offenders may be sentenced to death (typically weapons and drug-related offenses),
lowering the age at which juvenile offenders could be waived to adult courts and of
course, building more prisons to accommodate all of these changes. Compounding the
impact of these laws was the concurrent reduction in federal funding for “social
programs.” Gradually, funding was reduced for AFDC, public medical and social
services, maternal, child health care, community health centers and child abuse
prevention and child protection services (Currie, 1990).
The combination of law and order and decreased funding for social services did
little to alter the trends associated with rising crime rates. By the end of the 1980s the
country was faced with rising crime rates, exploding prison populations and diminished
social services programs. States were struggling to find solutions to the sheer costs
associated with implementation and enforcement of the law and order approach to crime.
However, the use of crime as a political tool was entrenched in American politics
by the end of the 1980s and successful political strategy (Democratic or Republican)
demanded that campaigns tout a strong approach to crime and drugs. While the political
appreciation of crime may be largely nonpartisan, differences in the choice of crime
control strategies emerge along party lines. Republicans tend to focus on social control
mechanisms including increased police protection, fewer restraints on law enforcement,
and increased use and length of incarceration (Caldeira and Cowart, 1980; Johnson and
Porter, 1978). On the other hand, Democrats typically argue for increased use of
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resources to address the underlying issues associated with the occurrence of crime such
as poverty, unemployment, and family disintegration (Caldeira and Cowart, 1980;
Johnson and Porter, 1978).
Perhaps one of the most memorable elections involving crime-related issues
occurred in 1988. George Bush effectively used the furlough turned crime spree of
Willie Horton to portray Michael Dukakis as “soft on crime” (Anderson, 1995). Focus
groups conducted by the Bush campaign and subsequent examination have confirmed the
effectiveness of the Horton ads in the defeat of Dukakis. Many consider the
Bush/Dukakis campaign to “epitomize the politicization of crime and the cooptation of
criminal justice” (Hancock and Sharp, 2004, 163).
In 1992, Bill Clinton did not allow the crime issue to be dominated by his
Republican opponent. (Marion, 1995). Rather, Clinton apparently learned a valuable
lesson from the Horton incident, and unlike most Democratic candidates, advocated a
strong law and order response to the issue of crime. Clinton campaigned on a platform
that espoused support for the death penalty and “promis[ed] to put 100,000 more law
enforcement officers on the street” (Hancock and Sharp, 2004,163, Marion, 1995).
Clinton fulfilled his promise and in 1994 partially “[i]n response to opinion polls ranking
crime as the number one problem facing the country, Congress authorized partial federal
funding of an additional 100,000 local police officers” (Levitt,1997, 271).
Thus, regardless of political ideology and affiliation, crime is a significant policy
issue which must be effectively addressed both before and after the election. Those who
desire reelection must demonstrate a continued commitment to efforts designed to
decrease crime.
26

Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s the war model continued to dominate
the national discussion about crime and drugs. The use of this metaphor reached its
highpoint during the Bush I administration when President Bush appointed a Drug Czar
and through the Office of National Drug Control Policy officially declared war on drugs
(Brownstein, 1996). The aim of the “war” was to “disrupt, dismantle and ultimately
destroy the illegal market for drugs” (Brownstein, 1996, 45). According to Walker
(1998) the elements of a war characterize the intensive police crackdowns on street-level
drug dealers; the collaboration of federal, state and local law enforcement (including the
use of the military); and more punitive sentencing policies toward drug offenders
(Walker, 1998, 250).
In their examination of the war model as a strategy to combat the proliferation of
crime and drugs, Merlo and Benkos (2004) note the latent consequences which attended
the use of the war model. These consequences included: (1) intensified racial tensions
resulting from targeting minorities; (2) concerns about erosion of civil rights as
aggressive law enforcement strategies are encouraged; (3) increased costs of criminal
justice and (4) continued fear of crime and criminals because efforts to reduce the
correlates of crime are generally minimal (Merlo and Benekos, 2004, 166; Merlo and
Benekos, 1992).
As predicted by the perturbated spiral compression model (Archambeault and
Archambeault, 1982), these consequences have gradually opened the door for discussion
about alternatives to the traditional law and order response to crime and more
specifically, drug control. While the current environment, both political and social, does
not appear willing to relinquish the demand for law and order, there is a movement which
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acknowledges the shortcomings of purely harsh policies which are inherently punitive
and is therefore willing to consider alternatives other than incarceration. However, in
order to command broad support among the public, policymakers and justice
professionals, the proponents of these alternatives will have to ensure that strategies
ensure accountability for offenders and public safety.

The Origin and Evolution of American Drug Courts
In the late 1980s the nation was struggling with dramatic increases in crime and
the high costs of incarceration. Especially troubling for policymakers was the continued
and alarming increase in the number of drug-related crimes. While the link between
drugs and crime has long been documented among criminal justice professionals, national
rates of drug-related crimes continued to escalate in the late 1980s and into the 1990s.
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001). According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
“between 1984 and 1999, the number of defendants charged with a drug offense in the
federal courts increased from 11,854 to 29, 306” (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001).
According to the National Institute of Justice, approximately 83% of state prisoners
scheduled for release in 1999 were involved with alcohol or drugs at the time of their
offense (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2003). Moreover, of the 1.7 million
individuals incarcerated in 1996, approximately 80% had a history of alcohol and drug
abuse (National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University,
1998). This is consistent with data published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 1997, approximately 83% of state
prisoners indicated that they had used drugs in the past (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
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2005). This reflects an increase from 79% of state prisoners in 1991 (Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2005).
In addition, according to the FBI as published in the Uniform Crime Report, in
1987 approximately 4.9% of homicides were drug-related (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2005). By 1989, 7.4% of homicides were drug-related (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2005). However, the UCR only includes those homicides which occur during a narcotics
felony. As such, the percentage of homicides which are drug-related, i.e. committed to
obtain money for drugs or otherwise in conjunction with the drug trade, are not included
in these statistics. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 2002, 8% of jail
inmates indicated that they committed a violent offense to obtain money for drugs
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005).
The percentage of property crimes related to drug addiction is significantly
higher. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, approximately 25% of property
offenders committed their crimes to obtain money for drugs in 2002 (Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2005). This represents an increase in the percentage of offenders (19% of state
prisoners; 16% of federal prisoners) who indicated they committed their current offense
to obtain money for drugs in 1997 between 1991 (17% of state inmates and 10% of
federal prisoners) (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005).
Actual drug use among offenders is also measured at the time of arrest. The
Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) program was implemented to identify drug
use patterns among adult and juvenile arrestees. This program collects data from 38 sites
throughout the United States. In 2000, ADAM reported that more than half of all adult
and juvenile arrestees tested positive for at least one drug (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
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2005). Interestingly, male adult arrestees were more likely to test positive for marijuana
whereas adult females were more likely to test positive for cocaine (Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2005). According to ADAM, marijuana and cocaine were the leading drugs
among juvenile arrestees as well.
As such, states were in the market for low-cost but effective crime control
strategies. Given the shift in American public opinion toward crime and criminal
offenders, especially those involved in the drug trade, policymakers and politicians were
sensitive to the need to fund programs which guaranteed accountability, deterrence and
swift implementation. Gone were the days when correctional officials could stress
rehabilitation and long-term correctional strategies. The public wanted immediate
intervention with swift consequences.
Despite the increasing demand for incapacitation and deterrence of criminal
offenders which followed a decade of the War on Drugs, many states faced federal
mandates to reduce prison overcrowding. The philosophy of locking up offenders and
throwing away the key had given rise to a significant increase in prison populations,
notably a luxury which very few states could reasonably afford or effectively manage.
Thus, while conservative crime control strategy was both marketable and palatable to the
polis, the expense of “get-tough” policies was taking its toll. Moreover, many offenders
serving lengthy prison sentences were non-violent offenders who were engaged in drugrelated offenses and had been sentenced pursuant to three-strikes laws and minimum
mandatory sentencing schemes. According to Shanahan, et al. (2004), “the rapid growth
in prisoner numbers coincided with rising bureaucratic and political skepticism about the
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effectiveness of jail in dealing with drug offenders” (Shanahan, et al, 2004, 3; U.S.
Department of Justice 1997).
Florida, like most other states in the late 1980s, was faced with a federal mandate
to reduce prison overcrowding. Given the popularity of conservative crime control
policies throughout the last two decades, the state was without many effective
alternatives to handle those individuals who would be released from state institutions as
well as to serve as effective community-based correctional strategies in the future. In
response to the mandate and the concurrent fear of sanctions and possible loss of federal
funding which typically accompanies noncompliance with such edicts, the Supreme
Court of Florida created a commission to be chaired by Judge Herbert M. Klein to
conduct research into a resolution which would effectively handle the systemic increase
in drug-related offenses and offenders (Wiseman, 2005; Nolan, 2001). The true task for
the Commission was to formulate alternatives which addressed the needs of drug-related
offenders yet protected public safety (Roman, et al., 2004; Nolan, 2001). The Court
provided Judge Klein with a one-year leave of absence from his judicial duties as chief
judge of the 11th judicial circuit in order to facilitate his research (Wiseman, 2005;
McAulye, Giever & Mays, 1998).
The result of Klein’s research revealed that a significant proportion of the increase
in prison populations was related to the drug trade and drug use and addiction. Like
many others, Klein found that a large number of inmates in state institutions were
convicted of drug-related offenses (Wiseman, 2005). Moreover, Klein’s research
revealed that a significant percentage of these individuals had been in and out of Florida’s
criminal justice system due to ongoing problems with drug addiction (Wiseman, 2005).
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Based on his findings, Judge Klein proposed a unique alternative to incarceration
of drug-addicted offenders: a treatment-based, judicially-administered intervention
program. The combined approach of treatment and judicial supervision was designed to
effectively manage the unique circumstances of the drug-addicted offender. The
program was designed to specifically provide attention to the underlying problem faced
by these offenders: drug addiction. However, this attention and treatment was provided
within the judicial milieu and as such, while coercive in nature, provided many offenders
with the structure that was conducive to their success. Supporters suggested that such an
approach was more likely to reduce recidivism among these offenders given the focus on
the root cause of their criminal behavior.
As a result, the first drug court program was created in Dade County, Florida in
1989 (Wiseman, 2005; National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2005a, 2005b;
Roman, et al., 2004; Nolan, 2001). The program was community-based yet stressed
accountability for offenders. Moreover, much of the cost of such programming was
offset by the payment of fees by participants. Such characteristics satisfied the need for
effective intervention with drug-addicted offenders while providing accountability in a
cost-effective manner. Thus, with the creation of this unique alternative, the demands of
the public, the judiciary, policymakers and federal authorities were seemingly addressed
in an effective and workable manner.
While the Dade County Drug Court Program is universally cited in the relevant
literature as the country’s first drug court program, Belenko (1998) acknowledges that the
concept of specialized courts designed to hear drug cases did not begin with the creation
of the Dade County Drug Court. Rather, New York City and Chicago experimented with
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the use of “drug case courtrooms” in the early 1950s (Belenko, 1998, 4). Moreover, in
response to growing issues with heroin addiction, New York City developed a system of
“Narcotics Courts” in the early 1970s (Belenko, 1998, 4). Yet, Belenko (1998) notes that
neither the drug case courtroom nor the narcotics courts emphasized treatment of
offenders.
While it may not be the first of its kind, the creation of the Dade County Drug
Court quickly generated widespread interest which eventually resulted in the First
National Drug Court Conference. The conference was held in Miami, Florida in 1993
and attendees included judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and drug treatment
professionals (Wiseman, 2005; National Institute of Justice Update, 1995). The official
purpose of the meeting was to generate a blueprint for the development of drug court
programs. The chief accomplishment during the conference was the development of a
list of essential elements of successful drug court programs (Wiseman, 2005; National
Institute of Justice Update, 1995). This list of core requirements for successful drug court
programs was designed to ensure that drug court programs adhered to a core group of
central tenets in order to ensure the integrity of the intervention. These tenets are more
thoroughly discussed in the following section.
The number of drug courts has steadily increased over the last two decades. An
important factor which has significantly contributed to the national growth of drug courts
is the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322). This
legislation includes “. . .federal support for the planning, implementation and
enhancement of drug courts for nonviolent drug offenders” (Belenko, 1998, 5). In
addition, in 1995, the Drug Courts Program Office was established under the auspices of
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the Department of Justice. This office was created to facilitate the provision of grants to
states for the establishment of drug court programs (Cooper, 2001). The Drug Court
Grant Program is a competitive, discretionary grant program designed to assist
communities with planning, implementation and enhancement of drug courts (Cooper,
2001, 12). According to Belenko, “[b]etween 1995 and 1997, the United States
Department of Justice, through its Drug Courts Program Office (DCPO) 3 , provided a
total of $ 56 million in funding to drug courts” (Belenko, 1998, 5).
According to the Bureau of Justice Assistance, as of April 2006, there were 1,557
fully operational drug courts throughout the United States and an additional 394 which
are currently in the planning stages (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2006). Moreover, the
use of drug court programming has also proven attractive to the juvenile court system.
As of April 2006, 406 juvenile, 166 family and 14 blended drug courts were fully
operational in the United States with an additional 101 juvenile, 86 family and 5 blended
drug courts in the planning stages (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2006). In addition to
use of drug court programming within the traditional adult and juvenile court systems,
there are currently 62 fully operational tribal drug courts and 61 others which are in the
planning stages (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2006). In addition, the drug court model
has been implemented abroad. Drug courts are currently operational in Puerto Rico,
Guam and Australia (Sanford and Arrigo, 2005).

3

The Drug Court Program Office (DCPO) is no longer operational.
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The Drug Court Model
As noted in the preceding section, the meeting of the First National Drug Court
Conference led to the development of the essential elements of a successful drug court
program (Wiseman, 2005; National Institute of Justice Update, 1995). These elements
are as follows:
•

Judicial commitment and leadership

•

Collaboration among criminal justice agencies, the courts, treatment agencies
and community organizations

•

Education and training programs in substance abuse, addictive behaviors and
their treatment for relevant personnel within the judicial system (prosecutors,
defense counsel, judges, treatment providers and public health officials)

•

A specific target population, defined as such by reference to its drug
involvement and risk to public safety

•

A custom designed treatment program addressing the specific treatment needs
of the target population

•

Integrated information management that links the court with criminal justice
and treatment agencies and also provides adequate supervision for defendants
and offenders

•

A detailed and comprehensive drug court implementation plan that would
include benchmarks, orientation and training for all affected personnel

•

Funding sources to support such drug court implementation and maintenance

•

An assessment strategy that defines outcomes and identifies the kind of
evidence required to measure those outcomes, as well as a timetable for
reporting and analyzing those outcomes (National Institute of Justice Update,
1995, pp. 1-2).

Despite the existence of these guidelines, there is no uniform model for drug court
programs. Rather, while much similarity exists there is significant variance among drug
court programs throughout the country as well as among programs in the same state.
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This, of course, has translated into difficulty for evaluators who desire to measure the
success of drug court programming. While a uniform model is elusive, drug courts, at
least true drug courts, share common goals. These goals are to decrease criminal
recidivism; to provide cost-effective intervention with drug offenders; to concentrate
expertise about drug cases into a single courtroom; to increase retention in drug treatment
through judicial supervision and sanction; and to provide drug-involved offenders with
the opportunity for affordable treatment; to address other needs of drug-involved
offenders through clinical assessment and effective case management; and lastly, to “free
up” judicial, prosecutorial and defense resources for other types of cases (National Drug
Court Institute, 2004; Belenko, 1998).
Despite the lack of a uniform drug court model, there are certain key features
which are common to most, if not all, drug court programs. These components include
the use of participant screening, voluntary participation, pre-trial diversion or probation,
treatment, case management, coordination among treatment providers and court
personnel, judicial supervision of participants as well as sanctions and rewards for
participants.

Participant Screening and Selection
Drug court programs utilize a host of screening tools to assist with participant
selection. In most jurisdictions, eligibility criteria are determined at the state level and
typically contained in a statute. While eligibility criteria vary considerably, most states
or jurisdictions restrict participation to non-violent or first-time offenders. Many
programs exclude individuals who are charged with or have past criminal histories
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involving violent offenses such as murder, rape, robbery or others. In addition, most
programs exclude individuals who are charged with or have a history of the sale or
distribution of a controlled substance. Such exclusions attempt to limit participation in
drug court to the non-entrepreneurial drug-related offender. Thus, offenders who are
clearly involved in the drug trade are typically excluded.
Moreover, participants must acknowledge their drug-related problems and
demonstrate a desire for treatment. Proper screening is essential to the operation of the
drug court and to ensure that those individuals who will benefit most receive services.
However, some discussion of the use of such selective criteria poses interesting
questions for analysts and requires attention to a phenomenon which is commonly
referred to as “widening the net” (Sigel and Senna, 2000). Widening the net describes
the process which occurs when “programs which are designed to divert offenders from
the justice system actually involve them more deeply in the official process” (Siegel and
Senna 2000, 32). For example, many offenders whose cases are processed by drug courts
may have, in the absence of a drug court program, have had their cases “passed to the
files” or dismissed due to the low priority of non-violent or misdemeanor offenses in
certain jurisdictions which may be suffering from overburdened dockets, low funding, or
high rates of violent crime. Thus, many argue that drug courts courts, like other
diversionary programs, actually widen the net and include many offenders (adult and
juvenile) in a process which they would have otherwise avoided.
This phenomenon particularly troubles labeling theorists who suggest that contact
with the official justice system increases the likelihood that an individual will be labeled
as deviant or criminal (Champion 2004; Siegel and Senna 2000). Once the label attaches,
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members of the community and justice professionals react to the individual in accordance
with the label (Champion 2004; Siegel and Senna 2000). The result of official and
unofficial labeling is akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy which is fulfilled when the
individual accepts the label and thereafter behaves accordingly (Champion 2004; Siegel
and Senna 2000).

Voluntary Participation
Voluntary participation is essential to the fidelity of drug courts. Because drug
courts are treatment-oriented, participation is not mandatory nor will judges mandate
participation by an unwilling defendant. Rather, drug court participants must be willing
and able to undergo drug treatment, counseling, life skills training and to obtain
employment. Thus, the typical drug court participant is a person who acknowledges their
drug problem and is willing to accept treatment. While the agreement to participate in
drug court programs is voluntary, a coercive element does accompany this participation.
Interestingly, a growing body of research suggests that coerced treatment may be as
effective as that which is purely voluntary in nature (Butts, et al., 2004; Anglin, Brecht
and Maddahian, 1989; Belenko, 1999; Collins and Allison, 1983; Hubbard et al., 1989;
Lawental et al., 1996; Miller and Flaherty, 2000; Siddall and Conway, 1988; Swartz,
Lurigio and Slomka, 1996; Trone and Young, 1996.)

Pre-trial Diversion or Probation-based Drug Courts
A survey of existing drug court programs reveals that there are two primary types
of programs. The most popular alternative is the use of drug court as a pre-trial diversion
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program. Diversion programs are designed to provide an alternative to traditional
judicial process. However, drug courts are only one example of the many varieties of
diversionary programs that currently exist. In exchange for participation in drug court,
the offender avoids a trial. In most diversion drug court programs, no plea is required of
the offender. Thus, the offender is not required to plead guilty to the offense in order to
participate. As a result, these programs are also commonly referred to as “pre-plea”
programs. Such programs are also referred to as “non-adjudicatory” in nature because
the offender avoids a criminal conviction for their offense, i.e. the offender is nonadjudicated. Thus, if the participant successfully completes the drug court program, their
current charge is forgiven in a sense.
Alternatively, if the offender fails to successfully complete the drug court
program and is terminated, the pending criminal charge is reinstated and the offender
returns to face trial. As with all diversion programs, due process and speedy trial issues
are waived by the defendant as a condition of participation. Once returned to face trial,
however, the defendant is vested with all constitutional rights that normally attend the
criminal justice process.
Not all programs are diversion-based. Rather, the other common drug
court model is the probation-based program. In these programs, the offender proceeds
through the traditional judicial process and if convicted (adjudicated) or enters a guilty
plea, is placed on probation. Thus, these programs are also referred to as “post-plea”
programs.
Probation is a conditional arrangement between the offender and the state. In
exchange for adherence to the conditions of probation, the offender may remain in the
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community with supervision. In many jurisdictions the offender may agree to participate
in drug court as a condition of their probation. Failure to adhere to the rules of drug court
will result in a probation violation and possible revocation. If probation is revoked, the
offender will receive a sentence, which typically includes incarceration, fines or a
combination thereof. However, in both models, drug court participants are typically
supervised by a probation officer.

Assessment and Treatment
The essence of a drug court program is accurate assessment followed by a
coordinated treatment plan. As with screening, drug court programs utilize a host of tools
to assess participants. Accurate assessment is critical to the success of the drug court
model. Assessment provides the necessary information in order to formulate a realistic
and appropriate treatment plan for the participant. In drug court programs, a significant
amount of information is gathered from the participant during the intake phase.
Drug court programs are designed to be flexible enough to allow for individual
treatment plans for each participant which, in turn, allows the program to address any
unique needs of the participant. While there is flexibility, most drug court programs are
organized into structured phases which vary in terms of the type of treatment,
expectations of the participant and the level of supervision. The length as well as the
number of phases varies among programs. However, most programs have four or five
phases. In Defining Drug Courts: The Key Components (1997), the Office of Justice
Programs suggests three phases, each of which takes approximately fifteen to twenty
months to complete. The range of therapeutic intervention is vast and the type of
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intervention which is offered within each drug court program is largely determined by
availability within geographic area of the drug court and the cost. Common treatment
modalities for substance abuse include: Multisystemic therapy (MST), Multidimensional
Family Therapy (MDFT), Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT), Relapse Prevention,
Individualized Drug Counseling (IDC), Supportive-Expressive Psychotherapy (SEP),
Motivational Enhancement Therapy (MET), Behavior Modification, Community
Reinforcement Approach (CRA). (Rossman, et al. 2004; National Institute on Drug
Abuse, 1999).
In many programs, the initial phase requires detoxification and/or inpatient
drug treatment. As the participant progresses (or graduates) through subsequent phases
treatment is typically administered on an outpatient basis. Based upon the assessment,
drug treatment may include detoxification, counseling and mental health services, family
therapy and other forms of therapeutic intervention.
However, treatment in drug court programs is not limited to traditional therapeutic
intervention. Rather, treatment as used in the drug court literature often includes
educational and vocational services, literacy skills, mentoring, participation in pro-social
activities, parenting classes, anger management treatment and other forms of support
services.
Research continues to confirm the value of appropriate drug treatment to the
reduction of drug use and criminal activity (Butts, et al., 2004; Anglin, Hser and Grella,
1997). However, with many forms of treatment retention of participants is problematic.
Thus, programs which are able to increase retention will be more effective. Supporters
suggest that the drug court model, with its emphasis on intensive case management,
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supervision and monitoring, is able to encourage participants to remain in treatment
(Butts, et al., 2004; Belenko, 2004; Roman and DeStefano, 2004).

Case Management and Supervision
According to Butts, et al. (2004, 228-9), case management fulfills two roles in the
drug court program. First, as gatekeeper for the criminal justice system and second, as
facilitator of client services (Roman, Harrell and Sack, 1998). Case management
involves assessment of program eligibility and treatment needs; identification of social
service needs, linking clients to appropriate treatment, monitoring client progress in
treatment and reporting the status of participants to the court (Butts, et al. 2004, 229).
Clearly, the case manager occupies a vital role in the drug court and is commonly viewed
by many as the linchpin of the process. In many drug courts the case manager or
administrator oversees the daily operations of the drug courts and typically has the
greatest amount of contact with clients. In some jurisdictions, the case manager is
responsible for conducting urinalysis as well. In most jurisdictions, the case manager is
responsible for reporting violations to the court and making recommendations regarding
sanctions. According to Butts, et al. (2004, 229), many case managers possess the
authority to impose sanctions for violations that do not warrant an appearance before the
court.
Ongoing and appropriate case management is believed to encourage retention of
drug court participants (Butts, et al. 2004; Schwarz et al., 1997). Given their proximity to
drug court participants, case managers are able to thwart potential problems in advance
and immediately address client needs. As a result, circumstances which may lead to
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reduced retention in other programs can be resolved. Thus, with increased attention case
managers are able to more effectively manage common occurrences which may
otherwise inhibit client participation.

Coordination and Integrated Service Delivery
A stated earlier, the provision of treatment and services in a structured setting is
one of the primary goals of drug court programs. Professionals associated with drug
court programs normally function as a team in order to coordinate their efforts. Thus,
most programs require professionals to meet on a weekly or biweekly basis to discuss
participant progress and needs. Such an approach allows all relevant professionals (drug
court staff, therapeutic professionals and other service providers) to come together in
order to facilitate the appropriate and efficient delivery of services. The anticipated result
is more effective communication among the drug court team and ancillary service
providers.

Judicial Interaction and Supervision
One of the most unique aspects of drug courts is the extent of interaction between
the participants and the judge. Drug court judges have an unusual relationship with drug
court participants when compared to the level and nature of contact involved in
traditional processing in the criminal justice system. In drug court programs, judges are
expected and encouraged to develop rapport with the participants and an enhanced level
of knowledge regarding the participants. In addition, drug court judges typically develop
an appreciation of the participant as an individual as opposed to an offender. Some judges
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tend to function as a paternalistic figure. In addition, most drug court judges undergo
training and education to assist with understanding the nature of drug addiction, available
treatment alternatives and the manner in which coordinated service delivery should be
administered.
In an evaluation of a Hawaii drug court, Kassebaum and Okamoto (2001) found
that the “dual capacity of the judge as both a formal and informal activist in the drug
court model was noted as the most influential structural component of the court”
(Sanford and Arrigo, 2005, 249; Kassebaum and Okamoto, 2001). These findings are
consistent with an examination of the role of the judge in a California drug court (See
Burns and Peyrot, 2003).

Sanctions and Rewards
One of the primary goals of a drug court is to provide treatment in a structured
setting which requires accountability of offenders. The primary means through which
accountability is achieved in the drug court setting is through the application of sanctions
and rewards. According to Cesare Beccaria (1981, 1764), in order to achieve its goal,
effective punishment should be certain, severe and swift. Only when these elements
converge will the threat of punishment actually deter individuals. In most cases, drug
court sanctions and rewards are designed with these three characteristics in mind.
Sanctions and rewards are typically graduated and in most cases pre-determined.
Participants are typically advised of the penalty for violations and the reward for
successful accomplishments. For example, in one program participants are advised that
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testing positive for drugs will result in three days in jail during Phase One. Certainly,
there are always exceptions.
Rewards are designed to provide incentives for participants as well as
acknowledge their accomplishments. Rewards range from tangible items like gift
certificates to programmatic items like bonus credits. However, given the unique nature
of drug addiction, rewards must be chosen very carefully. Thus, certain items that could
be easily traded for drugs or sold for drug money are discouraged.

Felony vs. Misdemeanor
Distinctions also exist among drug courts with regard to the type of case. Drug
courts may be limited to cases which are felonies or misdemeanor. A felony is generally
defined as a criminal offense which is punishable by more than one year in the state
penitentiary. A misdemeanor is typically a less-serious criminal offense which is
punishable with a monetary fine or a period of time in the local jail. Thus, the primary
distinction lies with the severity of the offense and the nature of the punishment.

Adult vs. Juvenile Drug Courts
Having reviewed the common elements of drug courts, it is important to
understand the differences which exist. One of the primary differences which exist
among the provision of drug court programming lies with the target population.
Currently, drug courts exist for both adult and juvenile offenders. While the key
components of each are largely the same, there are some differences which warrant
discussion.
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Cooper (2001) identifies four areas of distinction among adult and juvenile drug
courts. However, most of the differences identified by Cooper (2001) are an extension of
one primary concern: that juvenile drug courts ensure that services and treatment
modalities are appropriate for juveniles.
The first major difference identified by Cooper (2001, 217-218) is the significant
difference in target populations and its impact on eligibility criteria (Cooper 2001, 217218). The fact that the target population involves juvenile offenders requires special
attention to ensure the philosophy and mission of the drug court is one that is appropriate
for youthful offenders. Interestingly, the treatment-oriented approach of drug courts is
entirely consistent with the philosophy of the juvenile court and its parens patriae
function.
Another difference between juvenile and adult drug courts is the need for
treatment and services which are tailored to meet the unique needs of adolescent
substance abusers. Cooper (2001) argues that juvenile drug courts must not discount the
impact of adolescence on the behavior of drug court participants. Again, however, the
locus of most juvenile drug courts is under the auspices of an existing juvenile court and
as such, these concerns are already familiar to those professionals.
In juvenile drug courts, heightened awareness must exist regarding the role of
family and peers in life of the juvenile. This is especially true when the home life of the
juvenile is not conducive to sobriety. While adult drug court participants have a greater
degree of control over their living arrangements, juveniles do not. As such, many
jurisdictions opt for home-based services and family-oriented treatment modalities to
encourage the involvement of the family in a productive manner (Rossman, 2004 et al.;
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Cooper, 2001). Lastly, sanctions, rewards and incentives must be appropriate for juvenile
participants (Cooper, 2001). Sanctions for juvenile participants include research papers,
letters of apology, attendance at a victim impact panel or paying for missed
appointments. Rewards may include gift certificates, being excused from drug court
meeting or verbal praise.
Another important consideration which emerges is confidentiality. Unlike their
adult counterparts, juvenile courts are confidential. Thus, the juvenile court is not an open
forum for the public, nor are juvenile records and court files available for public scrutiny.
As such, juvenile drug court programs which utilize a network of service providers must
ensure that these providers understand the nature of the juvenile court system. Many
juvenile court drug programs require treatment and service providers to execute
confidentiality agreements to ensure privacy for juvenile participants. However,
confidentiality policies and agreements must ensure that the drug court team and service
providers have access to necessary information (National Drug Court Institute/National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, 2003).
The final issue which emerges when considering juvenile drug court programs is
the need to establish a solid relationship with the educational system. While adult drug
court programs may address obtaining a GED, enrolling in community college or
university courses, juvenile drug court programs must work to incorporate school
attendance and truancy issues within its mission. Thus, with juvenile drug court
programs the educational system the family are additional stakeholders.
Clearly, a significant amount of variance exists among drug court programs.
However, the key tenets of the drug court model typically serve as the blueprint with
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jurisdictions having to fine tune their programs based on demographics which exist
within their jurisdiction, available services within the community, cost of services and
any unique needs of their community. The differences among types of drug court
programs have proven challenging for evaluators to compare success among different
programs. However, a significant and growing body of literature exists with regard to
drug court evaluation. Yet, it is only through robust evaluation that we may learn
whether drug courts fulfill their goals or are simply another popular alternative.

Perception versus Performance: Evaluations and Outcomes
Drug courts have proven to be extremely popular. In the two decades which have
given rise to widespread growth of drug courts, the public, justice professionals and
treatment providers appear to be pleased with the model. However, the question remains:
are drug courts effective tools in the fight against drug-related crime?
Significant evaluation of drug court programs has occurred and the results are
encouraging. However, evaluations are as varied as drug court programs. As such, the
literature does not reveal a one-size fits all method which is appropriate for drug court
evaluation. Rather, as with evaluations of other programs, the traditional indicators of
success include low rates of recidivism, cost-effectiveness, and retention rates (National
Drug Court Institute, 2004).
Evaluations of drug courts utilize either outcome measures, process measures or
cost-benefit analysis. Outcome measures typically include those relating to drug
involvement and criminal activity and those which indicate improvements in life
circumstances (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2006). Measures which related to drug
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involvement and criminal activity include drug test results, rearrest rates, length of time
to rearrest, subsequent convictions and self-reported drug use. Measures related to
improvement in quality of life include educational attainment (high school diploma,
GED, vocational classes), mental and physical health, employment, reduction in public
assistance, and the ability to maintain housing or stable living arrangements.
Process measures are also common in the literature relating to drug court
performance. According to Logan, et al. (2000, 370), “a process evaluation, in contrast to
examination of program outcome only, can provide a clearer and more comprehensive
picture of how drug court impacts those involved in the drug court process (e.g. judges,
staff, clients, defense attorneys, treatment providers and prosecutors).” According to
Sanford and Arrigo (2005), “[d]rug court process studies attempt to move beyond the
goals of traditional outcome evaluations by examining the key processes and structural
components of drug courts” (Sanford and Arrigo, 2005, 247).
Process measures generally examine issues such as admissions (number, nature
and quality), completion and attrition rates, sanctions and rewards, services provided
(including inpatient and outpatient services), drug testing (number, nature and quality),
length of time participant remains in program, type and nature of contact with the judge
and the overall level of supervision of participants (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2006;
Festinger et al., 2002; Goldkamp, 2003; Kassebaum & Okamoto, 2001; Longshore et al.,
2001; Marlowe et al., 2003; Olson, Lurigio & Albertson, 2001; Saum, Scarpetti &
Robbins, 2001).
Measures of cost-effectiveness typically include a comparison of the cost of drug
court programming as compared to traditional probation or incarceration, cost savings
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associated with integrated service delivery and use of contract providers, cost savings
generated from fee and fine payments by participants and cost savings generated from
public assistance, unemployment and other forms of public assistance.

Limitations of Prior Research
Despite the abundance of drug court evaluation which has occurred, many of the
projects suffered from a lack of methodological rigor and as such, the results of these
evaluations must be interpreted with caution (Sanford and Arrigo, 2005: 241; U.S. GAO,
1997; U.S. GAO, 2002; U.S. GAO 2005; Belenko, 1998; Belenko, 1999, Belenko, 2001).
In response to a mandate contained in the 21st Century Department of Justice
Appropriates Authorization Act 4 , the United States General Accounting Office,
hereinafter “GAO”, conducted its own evaluation of the drug court performance literature
and the effectiveness of drug courts.
The first GAO summary report was released in 1997. The 1997 report contained
an analysis of twelve drug court evaluations. Following its review, the GAO found that
the evaluations varied significantly in terms of “validity, methodology and scope”
(Sanford and Arrigo, 2005, 241). As such, the GAO concluded that no representations
regarding the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of drug courts could be made (Sanford and
Arrigo, 2005, 241; U.S. GAO, 1997). The GAO noted that these evaluations were
positive but “presented little empirical evidence about the effectiveness of drug court
programs in reducing recidivism and substance abuse.” (U.S. GAO, 2005, 4).

4

Pub. L. No. 107-272, 116 Stat. 1758, 1799 (2002).
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In its 2002 report, the GAO specifically commented on the failure of the Drug
Court Program Office to effectively manage data submitted by drug court programs
(Sanford and Arrigo, 2005, 241; U.S. GAO, 2002). This, in turn, contributed to the
inability to conduct reliable studies regarding drug court effectiveness (Sanford and
Arrigo, 2005, 241; U.S. GAO, 2002). Specifically troubling to GAO was the failure to
the DCPO to implement a prior recommendation by GAO which encouraged the
collection of data on a national level regarding post-program drug relapse or recidivism
data (Sanford and Arrigo, 2005, 241; U.S. GAO, 2002).
Belenko (1998, 1999 and 2001) also noted deficiencies in prior research. Like
GAO, Belenko (1998, 1999 and 2001) acknowledged that weaknesses in previous studies
included the failure to utilize a comparable control group, short follow-up periods and the
failure to measure program outcomes other than recidivism (Sanford and Arrigo, 2005).
In his initial evaluation of existing research, Belenko (1998) reviewed thirty
evaluations of twenty-four drug court programs. Following review, Belenko (1998, 22)
identified several “gaps in our knowledge about drug courts.” These gaps include the
following: the need for longer follow-up periods, use of alternative outcomes (most
studies utilize rearrest), more extensive cost-benefit analysis, in-depth examination of
treatment services and the impact of those particular services on outcomes, follow-up
evaluations for programs still in the developing stages to assess incremental changes and
implementations of programmatic changes and greater use of experimental designs with
random assignment (Belenko, 1998, 22-23). In addition, Belenko (1998) encouraged the
development of baseline measures to gauge the treatment of drug-related offenders in that
jurisdiction prior to the implementation of the drug court program. While Belenko
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(1998) acknowledged that the development of baseline measures could be a cumbersome
and labor-intensive endeavor, the effort would be worthwhile to “provide some
comparison group data and to support any future efforts to estimate cost savings from the
drug court” (Belenko, 1998, 22).

Drug Court Performance: General Findings
The most recent U.S. GAO report was released in 2005. The 2005 report began
with a sample of 117 evaluations of adult drug court programs in the United States which
were published between May 1997 and January 2004. These evaluations examined
recidivism, substance use relapse or program completion outcomes (U.S. GAO, 2005).
From this sample, 27 evaluations which met certain methodological criteria (use of and
comparison with an appropriate control group) were selected for further review. 5 The 27
evaluations provided information on 39 adult drug court programs. In addition to the
review, GAO staff conducted interviews with drug court research analysts and officials at
the Department of Justice, the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) (U.S. GAO, 2005).
From a more sound methodological basis, the GAO reached some general
conclusions regarding the performance of drug courts which may be summarized as
follows:
1. Lower recidivism rates (including rearrest and reconviction) rates among drug
court participants than control group members.
2. Fewer recidivism events among program participants when compared to
control group members.
5

Four of these studies contained sufficient cost-benefit data. (U.S. GAO, 2005).
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3. Lower recidivism rates among drug court participants regardless of the type of
offense committed by the participant.
4. Inconclusive evidence regarding the impact of drug court operation and
programming (judicial behavior, amount of treatment received, level of
supervision, sanctions) on recidivism.
5. Reduction in recidivism rates continued for “some period of time” (typically
one year) after participants completed the drug court program.
6. Mixed results regarding substance use relapse. 6 Drug test results indicated a
reduction in use while participants were active in the program, however, selfreport measures showed “no significant reductions in use.”
7. Completion rates ranged from 27 to 66% among programs. Compliance with
program requirements was the only variable which “consistently predicted”
program completion.
8. Of those programs with sufficient cost-benefit data, six resulted in costs
which exceeded traditional processing. However, when the net benefit of drug
court programming is measured with the inclusion of savings from recidivism and
costs to victims, those programs produced a positive net benefit (U.S. GAO,
2005).
Thus, the GAO findings are encouraging for the continued use of drug courts.
GAO recommendations for future research include the examination of participant
characteristics and program components which are related to program compliance in light
of the significant relationship between program compliance and completion and reduced
recidivism (U.S. GAO, 2005, 7). Thus, future research endeavors should focus on the
existing or development of program features which contribute to increased retention.
Despite the limitations of previous studies, Belenko (1998, 1999, 2001) like
GAO, acknowledges that the preliminary data regarding drug courts is both positive and
consistent. Belenko (1998) acknowledged that drug courts are more successful in
retaining offenders in treatment, provide greater supervision than traditional supervision,
6

Substance use relapse data were available from eight of the evaluations reviewed by GAO.
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have resulted in substantial reductions of criminal behavior while clients are participating
in the drug court program which generally continues for a period of one year postprogram and generate cost savings. In addition, Belenko (1998) concludes that “drug
courts have been successful in bridging the gap between the court and the
treatment/public health systems and spurring greater cooperation among the various
agencies and personnel within the criminal justice system, as well as between the
criminal justice system and the community” (Belenko, 1998, 21).
In his most recent analysis of drug court research, Belenko (2001) concluded that
studies continue to indicate the reduction of crime and substance abuse among drug court
participants when compared to similar offenders (Belenko, 2001,1). Further, Belenko
(2001) concluded that current evaluations demonstrate that completion rates of drug court
participants range from 36 to 66 percent (Belenko, 2001, 1).
Wilson, et al. (forthcoming) also conducted a synthesis of the existing drug court
evaluation research. Like Belenko (1998, 1999, 2001) and the U.S. GAO (1997, 2002,
2005), Wilson, et al. concluded that evidence suggests that drug court participants are less
likely to reoffend when compared to offenders who receive standard probation as a
disposition.
Having reviewed the existing literature which synthesizes the wealth of existing
literature, the following sections will examine the literature within the framework of
more specific issues: recidivism, retention rates and cost-benefit of drug courts.
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Recidivism
When evaluating programs within the justice system, many researchers rely on
recidivism as a measure of whether the particular program is effective. Scholars,
practitioners and the public generally conclude that effective programs reduce crime on a
general or specific level. General deterrence suggests that the presence of suitable
sanctions or punishments will deter criminal activity by others (Siegel and Senna 2000).
Thus, the possibility of punishment is sufficient to prevent or deter others from engaging
in illegal behavior. In contrast, specific deterrence refers to the impact of punishment or
the threat thereof on a particular individual (Siegel and Senna, 2000). For example, those
individuals who are incarcerated are deterred, through incapacitation, from committing
additional crimes.
As such, one method through which to evaluate whether a particular program or
policy is an effective deterrent is to measure the rate of recidivism among those who have
been subjected to the program or policy. Those programs with little or no effect on
recidivism are viewed as ineffective whereas programs whose participants are less likely
to re-offend are deemed effective.
As noted in the preceding section, the research indicates that drug courts are an
effective tool in reducing recidivism among program participants and graduates. In 2003,
the National Institute of Justice released its findings from a nationwide evaluation of
17,000 drug court graduates (Roman, et al. 2003). Only 16.4% of program graduates had
been rearrested for a felony within one year following program completion.
According to the National Drug Court Institute (2004), the largest statewide study
on drug courts evaluated drug courts in New York. Examination of recidivism rates
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revealed that drug court participants were, on average 29% less likely than nonparticipants to re-offend within a three-year follow-up period (Rempel, et al., 2003).
In one of the most frequently cited works, Gottfredson and Exum (2002) found
that drug court participants had significantly lower rates of recidivism than individuals in
a comparable control group. This study was designed to examine the impact of the
Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court (BDTC). Most importantly and unlike many other
evaluation efforts, this study incorporated random assignment of offenders into either a
treatment (drug court) or control group (probation). Data included information obtained
at intake, criminal history records as well as twelve-month treatment and recidivism data.
Gottfredson and Exum (2002) found that drug court participants (48%) were
significantly less likely than their counterparts (64%) to be rearrested. Further, drug
court participants had a sixteen percent (16%) reduction in the rate of arrest one year
following admission into the program (Gottfredson and Exum, 2002, 350). In addition,
the difference between new arrests and new charges among participants and the control
group was statistically significant with drug court participants have fewer numbers of
new arrests and charges. Moreover, nearly four times as many control group members
were rearrested for a violent offense when compared to the drug court participants
(Gottfredson and Exum, 2002, 350).
In an effort to continue the examination of the Baltimore City Drug Treatment
Court, Banks and Gottfredson (2004) examined time to rearrest among drug court
participants. This project utilized an experimental design to examine the impact of drug
court treatment on time until first arrest during a two-year period following
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randomization. The authors employed survival analysis7 to determine whether drug court
participants had a significantly longer time to failure than control sample members
(Banks and Gottfredson, 2004, 646). In general, Banks and Gottfredson (2004) found
that drug court participants as significantly less likely to fail (rearrest) and had a longer
time to failure.
An evaluation of two Florida drug court programs indicated that drug court
graduates were significantly less likely than their probation counterparts to be rearrested
and had fewer arrests during a thirty-month follow-up period (Peters and Murrin, 2000).
In addition, rates of arrest among drug court participants declined in proportion to the
duration of drug court participation (Peters and Murrin, 2000). The time to rearrest
among drug court participants was also significantly longer than the time for nonparticipants.
In their evaluation, Wolfe, Guydish and Termondt (2002) found that rearrest rates
during a two-year follow-up period were considerably lower for drug court participants
(19%) than for non-participants (53%). Similar findings were reported by Fielding, et al.
(2002) in their evaluation of a drug court program in Los Angeles County. During a
twelve-month follow-up period, Fielding, et al. (2002) found that 20% of drug court
graduates reoffended compared to 51% of offenders who did not participate in a
diversion program. Fielding, et al. (2002) also found that the rate of drug-related arrests
among drug court graduates was significantly less than those among the control group.

7

Survival analysis examines the relationship among offender characteristics, intervention type, offenserelated variables and time to rearrest (Banks and Gottfredson, 2004; 646).

57

Brewster (2001) found that Pennsylvania drug court participants had a rearrest rate of
5.4% as compared to 21.5% rearrest rate of nonparticipants. 8

Program Retention
Another common indicator of drug court effectiveness presented in the literature
is program retention. One of the inherent challenges for strategies designed to facilitate
drug treatment is program retention, i.e. the ability to maintain the participant in the
program long enough to produce meaningful change. Given the dynamics of addiction,
the first several months are an extremely critical time for the participant. Thus, one
measure of success for drug courts is whether they are able to retain the participants and
facilitate completion of the program.
The U.S. GAO 2005 report specifically addressed completion rates (the number
of individuals who successfully completed a drug court program as a percentage of the
total number) among drug court programs. U.S. GAO found that completion rates among
sixteen drug court programs ranged from 27 to 66 percent. Moreover, the GAO
emphasized that compliance with program requirements was a predictor of the rate of
completion (U.S. GAO, 2005). Attendance at treatment sessions and status hearings as
well as engaging in treatment early in the program were consistently related to program
completion (U.S. GAO, 2005). In addition to the adherence to program requirements,
certain demographics were related to completion rates. These included criminal history

8

See also, an evaluation of a drug court in Dade County, Florida by Goldkamp and Weiland (1993) which
reported a 33% rearrest rate for drug court participants and 48% among non-participants. Texas evaluation
revealed 15.6% rearrest rate among drug court graduates and 48.7% rearrest rate for non-participants
(Turley and Sibley, 2001)
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and age. Thus, older participants and those with less involvement with the criminal
justice system were more likely to complete the program (U.S. GAO, 2005).
The 1997 U.S. GAO report contained similar findings among drug courts where
an analysis of 131 drug court programs yielded an average retention rate of 71% (U.S.
GAO, 1997).
In their evaluation of the New York drug court system, Rempel, et al., (2003)
documented a 65% retention rate among participants. This rate exceeded the national
retention rate of 60% (Rempel, et al., 2003). In his review of the drug court evaluation
literature, Belenko (2001) found that the average graduation rate among eight programs
which collected such data was 47% (See also, Belenko, 1998). Like others, Belenko
(2001, 1998) suggests that the retention success of drug court programs may be attributed
to greater supervision, access to treatment and other related services, acceptance of
relapse and graduated sanctions and rewards.
According to Peters and Murrin (2000, 74), “over a period of one year, drug
courts successfully retain about 60% of participants in comparison with only about 35%
of offenders who are retained after three months of involvement in outpatient treatment”
(See also, Cooper, 1998; Hubbard, et al., 1988). Impressive retention rates were also
present in the evaluation of two Florida drug courts conducted by Peters and Murrin
(2000). Forty-eight percent of participants graduated in one of the programs while 53%
of participants graduated in the other.
In their process evaluation of drug courts, Logan et al. (2000) found that 42% of
drug court participants graduated and 44% exited before graduation. Logan et al. (2000)
indicated that the factors which distinguished graduates and non-graduates were: age,
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time to serve, prior incarceration, acknowledgement of addiction issue, family support,
level of commitment and intellectual and social functioning (Logan et al. 2000, 381).
Higher completion rates are typically associated with greater supervision by drug
courts and participants who have significantly reduced criminal histories and substance
abuse rates when compared to other offenders (Peters and Murrin 2000, 74). Thus, the
very nature of the drug court participant may contribute to the positive outcomes
reflected in the evaluation literature.

Cost-Benefit Analysis
The literature which examines drug courts from a cost-benefit perspective is
limited but growing. Like the preceding measures of program success, cost-benefit
analysis of drug court programs supports the claims of drug court proponents regarding
cost-effectiveness (American University, 2006).
According to the 2005 U.S. GAO report, of those programs with sufficient
cost-benefit data, six resulted in costs which exceeded traditional processing (U.S. GAO,
2005). However, when the net benefit of drug court programming is measured with the
inclusion of savings from recidivism and costs to victims, those programs produced a
positive net benefit (U.S. GAO, 2005).
Logan, et al. (2004) conducted a cost-benefit analysis of three drug court
programs in Kentucky. This evaluation utilized data regarding costs associated with
program participants as compared to costs associated with individuals who were assessed
but failed to meet selection criteria for or declined drug court participation. Economic
cost analysis was conducted by use of the Drug Abuse Treatment Costa Analysis
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Program (DATCAP) which is a cost data collection instrument and interview guide
designed for use in treatment and social service settings (Logan, et al., 2004; French,
2001a, b; French, et al.,1997; McCollister and French, 2002; Salome and French, 2001).
DATCAP enables analysts to estimate both accounting costs (direct/out of pocket
expenditures) and opportunity costs (program expenditures and the market value of
donated or subsidized materials or resources) in order to provide a comprehensive
measure of costs associated with programs which include service delivery. In addition to
the expanded assessment of costs, the analysts included a comprehensive assessment of
benefits associated with the operation of drug courts in areas such as the criminal justice
system, earnings of participants, payment of child support, mental health utilization,
domestic violence and traffic accidents.
The authors reported that the costs of the Kentucky drug court programs were
comparable to or lower than drug court programs in other states. Moreover, costs of drug
court programming were significantly lower than the costs associated with incarceration.
When the investment value of drug courts was examined, the greatest returns were
associated with program graduates who generated a benefit-cost ratio of $3.83 ($3.83
return for every dollar invested) throughout the twelve-month period following
graduation or a net economic value of $14,526.00 9 (Logan, et al., 2004, 392).
An evaluation of a Virginia drug court estimated that one-year admissions (440
drug court clients) resulted in a cost savings of $2,476,795.00 (Finigan, 1998). However,
when costs associated with victimization, theft reduction, public assistance and medical

9

When graduates and terminators were included in the analysis, the net economic benefit associated with
program participation was $5446.00 per participant or a $2.71 return on every dollar invested in drug court
programs.
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claims were included Finigan (1998) estimated a costs savings of $10,223,532.00 over a
two-year period. Thus, for every dollar spent on drug court programs there was a return
of $2.50 (Finigan, 1998; 1999).
While not as comprehensive in terms of measuring accounting and opportunity
costs, in his cost-benefit analysis of two juvenile drug courts in North Dakota, Thompson
(2002) found that relative to sending a juvenile to the training school or other forms of
out-of-home placements in residential facilities, drug courts produced an annual savings
of $400,260 and $303,250. A review of the available literature reveals that, regardless of
methodological rigor, outcome and process evaluations dominate the existing scholarship
on drug court programs. As such, a gap in the literature exists with regard to examination
of those factors which impact the implementation of drug court programs throughout the
country.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The present study examined drug court program implementation. Its scholarly
value lies in its examination of the implementation of an experimental public policy tool.
As a result, this project will contribute further to the existing literature about drug court
operations and will specifically augment the literature with an examination of drug court
implementation. This chapter is divided into sections which discuss methodological
issues. The discussion includes population and sample selection, hypotheses
identification, research model specification and variable identification.

Research Design
The study was exploratory in nature. Given the lack of existing literature about
those factors which may or may not impact drug court program implementation, this
study sought to identify the same. This study specifically seeks to explore whether topdown or bottom-up variables influence the successful implementation of drug court
programs.
The primary research question underlying this project is the examination of those
variables which influence drug court program implementation. Grounded in a thorough
review of the available literature, two perspectives emerge when analysts examine the
actual implementation of public policy. As discussed earlier, these include top-down and
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bottom-up approaches. The literature suggests that, given the nature of the setting under
examination in the present project, a bottom-up approach is most appropriate. However,
in light of the strong theoretical support for top-down variables such as policy directives,
statutory guidance and legislative requirements, survey items which address these
variables are included (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989). Moreover, even those scholars
who have been most closely associated with the top-down perspective have now moved
away from approaches which are purely macro-level in nature (Sabatier, 1988).
While identical variables are not employed, the two general hypotheses which
guide the proposed project are similar to those in Keiser and Meier (1996). Keiser and
Meier (1996) utilized top-down and bottom-up variables in their examination of policy
design, bureaucratic incentives and the implementation of federal child support
enforcement measures. Such an approach is an interesting blend of those suggested by
the policy design literature as well as those commonly found in the implementation
literature. Their work also presents a unique nexus between the worlds of public policy
and public management. This approach is persuasive; therefore, this study incorporated
variables which are representative of top-down and bottom-up influences in order to
examine which variables, if any, are more likely to influence successful drug court
program implementation.
The first hypothesis suggests that successful implementation of public policy is
influenced by policy design variables such as statutory guidance relating to goals and
implementation, policy directives, policy coherence, financial incentives and support,
tractability of the problem, nature of the target population and eligibility criteria (Keiser
and Meier, 1996; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989). The second and alternative general
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hypothesis suggests that successful implementation of public policy is influenced by local
level variables such as support and cooperation of local actors, politicians and the general
public; the availability of local staff, resources and training; the presence of a sufficient
target population; and local actors’ perceptions of the program/policy. Many of these
local level variables, as they are operationalized, are similar to implementation and
enrollment barriers included in the SVORI evaluation conducted by Lattimore, Visher,
and Lindquist (2005).
Specific research hypotheses which will be tested in the present study are as
follows:
H1a:
H1b:
H1c:
H1d:
H2a:
H2b:
H2c:
H2d:

H3a:
H3b:
H3c:
H4d:

Federal actors will have no impact on the perception of drug court success.
State actors will have a positive impact on the perception of drug court
success.
Local actors will have a positive impact on the perception of drug court
success.
Demographic characteristics of drug court judges and administrators will
have no impact upon the perception of drug court success.
Federal actors will have no impact on the perception of offender-related
indicators of drug court success.
State actors will have a positive impact on the perception of offenderrelated indicators of drug court success.
Local actors will have a positive impact on the perception of offenderrelated indicators of drug court success.
Demographic characteristics of drug court judges and administrators will
have no impact upon the perception of offender-related indicators of drug
court success.
Federal actors will have no impact on the perception of service-related
indicators of drug court success.
State actors will have a positive impact on the perception of servicerelated indicators of drug court success.
Local actors will have a positive impact on the perception of servicerelated indicators of drug court success.
Demographic characteristics of drug court judges and administrators will
have no impact upon the perception of service-related indicators of drug
court success.
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Sample Selection and Rationale
Drug court programs are now present in every state. Currently, there are
approximately 1,500 drug court programs throughout the United States with an additional
four hundred programs in the planning phase. To enhance external validity, multiple
external sites were originally selected with reference to specific criteria. These states
were identified due to the similarity which exists among the operation, structure and
official drug court program goals; adherence to the Key Components of Drug Courts; the
existence of an administrative mechanism to provide oversight of drug court programs;
and the existence of a sufficient number of operational programs in those jurisdictions.
Although external validity is enhanced as more states are included in the sample,
the difference in programming and the lack of accurate and current mailing lists for drug
court judges and administrators would impact internal validity (within state selection
bias) and statistical conclusion validity (e.g., Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). Of
those states which satisfied the criteria discussed above, five states (Alabama, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Utah) were ultimately chosen for inclusion. The population
for the present study included 340 drug court judges and administrators from those five
states (response rate 33.5%, n = 114).
Drug court judges and administrators were selected as these individuals are the
primary actors responsible for the implementation and oversight of drug court programs.
Drug courts are not mandated by state legislatures, but rather are authorized if the local
jurisdiction desires and pursues the establishment of a drug court program. As such, drug
court judges usually possess the initial motivation to develop these programs in their
jurisdiction. Thereafter, it is the judge and the drug court administrator who are primarily
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responsible for the organization and implementation of the program. As such, judges and
administrators are believed to possess the knowledge required to most accurately evaluate
the impact of the independent variables upon successful implementation.
All active drug court programs in each state were included in the sample.

State profiles
In Mississippi 10 , there are currently 17 operational drug court programs
throughout the state. There are eleven felony drug court programs, two adult
misdemeanor drug court programs and four juvenile court programs. These programs
utilize 38 drug court judges and administrators. Additional drug court programs are
planned for future development.
In Alabama, there are currently 16 operational drug court programs. Like
Mississippi, Alabama’s operational drug court programs include felony, misdemeanor
and juvenile court programs. These programs utilize 30 drug court judges and
administrators.
In Louisiana, there are currently 43 operational drug court programs throughout
the state. Of these, 17 are juvenile drug court programs. These programs utilize 86 drug
court judges and administrators.
In Utah, there are currently 28 drug court programs. There are 14 adult felony
drug courts, four adult misdemeanor drug courts, six family drug courts and four
juvenile drug courts. Utah, unlike the other states, has six family drug courts to
address addiction issues which arise during the course of domestic relations cases.
10

See Dunaway et al. (2005) for an evaluation of Mississippi’s longest-running drug court program.
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In Florida, there are 100 operational drug court programs throughout the state.
There are 47 adult felony drug courts, 32 juvenile drug courts, 21 dependency
drug courts and two DUI courts.
Survey Instrument
Following a review of the literature and focused conversations with drug court
judges and administrators, a survey instrument was designed (Appendix A). Prior to the
survey being fielded, a pilot study was conducted. Qualified experts in survey
methodology, as well as subject area experts (drug court judges and court administrators),
reviewed the instrument for errors, redundancies, clarity and comprehensiveness.
Further, the experts were asked to complete the instrument to determine the time for
completion as well as survey item organization and flow (Babbie, 2001; Dillman, 2000).
The pilot study resulted in several items being rephrased, as well as item additions,
deletions and consolidations. On average, the reviewers reported that the survey
instrument required approximately twenty to thirty minutes to complete.
The final survey instrument was eight pages in length and contained 36 survey
items designed to address the research objectives and hypotheses. Areas of inquiry
addressed by survey items included the following:
1.

Drug court operations (10 items)

2.

Goals of the drug court program (2 items)

3.

Support for or resistance to implementation by actors (3 items)

4.

Influence of federal, state and local actors (2 items)

5.

Incentives for implementation (2 items)
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6.

Obstacles to implementation (2 items)

7.

Perceived importance of drug courts (1 item)

8.

Implementation actions (2 items)

9.

Perceived success of drug courts (3 items)

10.

Demographic data (7 items)

Drug court operations were measured by ten survey items. These items explored
the length of drug court operation, the client caseload, nature of clients, jurisdictional
issues and types of funding. These items were measured with a series of survey items
designed to solicit categorical responses.
Drug court goals were measured by two survey items. The first, survey item 11,
was a Likert-type survey item which requested respondents to characterize the level of
importance of certain goals within their drug court program. Respondents were asked to
characterize the goals from “not important” to “very important.” These goals were
derived from the National Drug Court Institute. In survey item 12, respondents were
asked to list the top three goals of their drug court program.
Support of or resistance to drug court implementation was addressed by survey
items 13 -15. Survey item 13 was a Likert-type item which asked respondents to
characterize the level of support or resistance to drug court implementation by federal,
state and local actors and agencies. Common among all levels of government were the
following actors: elected officials, corrections officials and mental health officials at the
federal, state and local levels of government. Additionally, federal actors included the
United States Department of Justice, while state actors included state attorneys general
and appellate court judges. Local actors included the local judiciary, district attorney,
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public defender, law enforcement officials, drug-related offenders and general public.
Survey response categories ranged from very supportive to very resistant.
Survey items 14 and 15 were open-ended items which asked respondents to
identify the actor who provided the most support for the implementation of drug court
programs and the most resistance, respectively, to the implementation of drug court
programs.
Survey item 16 was a Likert-type question which asked respondents to
characterize the degree of influence exercised on drug court implementation by various
federal, state and local actors (see previous description of various actors). Survey
response categories ranged from “no influence” to “very influential.” Survey item 17
was an open ended question which asked respondents to identify the actors which
exercised the most influence over the implementation of drug courts.
Survey item 18 asked respondents to indicate whether various incentives for drug
court implementation existed during the development of their drug court program.
Incentives included financial assistance/matching funds, grant funds, State Court
Advisory Board, staff training, technical assistance, MIS, data collection and evaluation
support and lastly, a drug court association. Respondents were asked to check all that
applied. Survey item 19 was an open-ended item which asked responded to identify the
incentive which they deemed most important to the development of their drug court
program.
Obstacles to the implementation of drug courts were measured using four survey
items. Survey item 20 asked respondents to indicate whether fifteen possible
circumstances which hindered the implementation of drug court programs were present.
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These circumstances could exist at the federal, state or local level. Respondents were
asked to check all that applied. Survey item 21 was open-ended and asked respondents to
identify the circumstance in survey item 20 which proved to be the most difficult to the
implementation of the drug court program. Survey item 22 was a Likert-type question
which asked respondents to indicate whether certain circumstances hindered participation
by offenders in the drug court program. Responses ranged from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree.” Survey item 23 was an open-ended question which asked respondents
to identify the top three circumstances which hindered participation by offenders.
Survey item 24 was a Likert-type question which asked respondents to
characterize the degree to which drug courts are viewed as important by various federal,
state and local actors (see previous description of various actors). Survey response
categories ranged from “not important” to “very important.”
The survey contained two items which measured implementation actions. In
survey item 25, respondents were asked to identify what actions from a list of twenty four
possibilities they undertook to successfully implement their drug court program. This
item simply asked respondents to indicate whether or not they engaged in that activity.
This item was followed by an open-ended question which asked respondents to identify
the top three most beneficial actions to the development of the drug court program.
Respondents’ perceptions of drug court success were measured with three survey
items. Survey item 7 was a Likert-type question which asked respondents to indicate the
degree to which the implementation of drug court programming resulted in the
improvement or deterioration of certain conditions or services. These conditions or
services included the following: recidivism of offenders, time spent in treatment,
71

payment of fees and fines, sobriety of offenders, jail crowding, delivery of probation
services, delivery of substance abuse treatment, inter-agency coordination, inter-agency
cooperation, public safety and confidence in the criminal justice system. Response
categories ranged from “significant deterioration” to “significant improvement.” Two
subsequent open-ended questions asked respondents to identify which condition or
service has improved the most and which had deteriorated the most due to the
implementation of the drug court program.
Overall, the survey was designed to solicit information which permits
examination of the administrative characteristics of drug court programs, programming
alternatives, funding sources and most importantly, the impact of top-down and bottomup factors upon the implementation of drug courts.
In addition to items related to the respondents’ perceptions and beliefs regarding
the influence of top-down and bottom-up variables, the following demographic data were
obtained: age, gender, highest level of education, current position, number of years in
current position, prior employment experience, estimated size of geographic area served,
estimated volume served by drug court program and nature of jurisdiction.

Measurement of Perceptions
Demographic and programmatic items aside, the survey relied on measurement of
the respondents’ perceptions about the impact of federal, state and local variables upon
the successful implementation of drug court programs. Reliance on perception data can
be problematic for a host of reasons. According to Saltzman, Paternoster, Waldo and
Chiricos (1982), accurate measurement of perceptions, especially with a cross-sectional
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methodology, is impossible. Utilization of a cross-sectional design, arguably, only
captures the perception of the respondents at the time the survey was completed.
Inherent in all research designs which employ such methods is the risk that perceptions
may change. However, measurement of perceptions is a common research method in the
social sciences.

Survey Procedures
Following pre-testing and revision, the research protocol and survey instrument
were submitted to the Institutional Review Boards of Mississippi State University and
The University of Southern Mississippi. Approval was sought from both institutions as
the author is a Ph.D. candidate at the former and a faculty member at the latter. As such,
approval to conduct research involving human subjects was obtained from both
institutions. Approval was obtained from Mississippi State University on November 21,
2006 and The University of Southern Mississippi on October 30, 2006 (see IRB approval
letters attached as Appendices B and C, respectively).
Following approval, drug court judges and administrators were identified through
the use of AOC (Administrative Office of Courts) for each state or state judicial websites.
A master mailing list was generated. Following generation of a mailing list, surveys were
disseminated to 340 drug court judges and administrators in selected states.
In the initial mailing, surveys were accompanied by a letter of introduction. The
letter of introduction served as the informed consent. The letter specifically advised
respondents that their research participation was voluntary, that all responses were
confidential and would not be associated with a particular individual or drug court
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program. Self-addressed postage-prepaid envelopes were included to enhance the return
rate.
A survey respondent postcard also was enclosed. In the letter, respondents were
requested to return this card separately from the survey. The postcard was utilized to
eliminate respondents’ names from the mailing list so that unnecessary reminders or
follow-ups were not sent (Dillman, 2000). The postcard was not associated with
individual surveys and only indicated that the respondent desired a copy of survey results
or did not wish to participate in the research project. A copy of the survey results was
offered as an incentive to participate (Dillman, 2000); no other incentives were offered.
Approximately ten days after the initial mailing, a follow-up letter was delivered
to participants as a reminder and thanked them for their participation. Approximately
two to three weeks later, a final letter accompanied by a second copy of the survey
instrument was mailed to those who had not responded. This letter stressed the
importance of their response and offered to conduct the survey by telephone.

Statistical Analysis
Data derived from the dissemination and return of survey instruments was entered
into SPSS Version 13.0 for Windows. The first form of statistical analysis applied to the
data was simple tabulation and reporting of frequencies for each category. Despite the
simplicity of tabulation and frequencies, this type of analysis often is useful in
exploratory research for several reasons. For example, these techniques allow an analyst
to draw rough comparisons among the data. In addition, these techniques allow an

74

analyst to identify areas, dimensions or topics which warrant further empirical
exploration through more sophisticated methodological techniques.
Multiple regression analysis was utilized in order to examine the influence of
federal, state and local variables and certain demographics upon the successful
implementation of drug court programs. Multiple regression analysis is appropriate when
there is a single dependent variable measured at interval or ratio level and multiple
independent variables are present (Hair, et al.1998). The objective is to determine if the
independent variables can be used to predict the value of a dependent variable.
In the first model, ten independent variables were utilized to determine their
impact, if any, on the dependent variable (Success of Drug Court). Additional models
were utilized in an effort to more specifically examine the influence of the independent
variables upon more specific aspects of the dependent variable utilized in the first model.
The use of rotated factor analysis (Varimax) resulted in more specific dimensions or
constructs of the dependent variable (Success of Drug Court).
The first construct was labeled Offender and included the following success
indicators: recidivism by offenders, time spent by offenders in treatment, payment of
fees and fines by offenders, sobriety of offenders and jail crowding. These indicators
involve the status of the offender within the drug court program. The second construct,
Service Delivery, included the following: delivery of probation services, delivery of
substance abuse treatment, inter-agency coordination and inter-agency cooperation. This
group involves the factors related to the delivery of services by the criminal justice
system.

75

Model 2 utilized the three government variables (federal, state and local) and
seven demographic variables to predict the value of the dependent variable labeled
Offender. Model 3 utilized the three government variables (federal, state and local) and
seven demographic variables to determine their impact on the dependent variable labeled
Service Delivery.

Strengths and Limitations of Method and Design
As with most research designs, both strengths and limitations exist. The primary
strength of the instant research design is the reliance upon prior research in the
formulation of variables and survey instrument. The dependent variable with the
exception of three criteria has been utilized by Maynard-Moody et al. (1990). The
additional three criteria employed in the dependent variable were derived from three
indicators which are almost universally cited as the primary indicators of drug court
success. Thus, the design and method is well-grounded in theory and prior research. An
additional strength of instant research design is its focus.
This project sought to specifically examine the differences, if any, which emerged
among the impact of different actors upon the perception of drug court success. Findings
regarding the impact of various actors, policies and agencies can help target those areas
which are in need of improvement. Moreover, the variables as measured by the survey
instrument allow the analyst to examine those incentives and obstacles which impact the
perception of drug court success. Thus, while much of the existing evaluation literature
indicates that drug courts appear to be successful, the present study begins to examine
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“why” and therefore contributes another piece of the puzzle to the existing literature
regarding drug court programs.
Methodological and design limitations appear to lie in three areas. First, drug
court programs chosen for inclusion in the sample are, with the exception of Utah,
derived from states which are located in the South. What if any impact this regional bias
may have on the perceptions of drug court judges and administrators is unknown. A
survey item which identified the state in which drug court judges or administrators were
located, was not included in the survey instrument. As such, the analyst was unable to
specifically examine regional bias. This was intentional and occurred in an effort to
ensure anonymity of respondents given the small number of drug court programs in
certain states.
Second, the survey instrument is eight pages in length. While survey items are
printed on the front and back of each page, this does not diminish the number of survey
items. As such, the sheer length of the survey is a limitation and may have impacted the
response rate. In addition, the survey takes approximately 20 to 30 minutes to complete.
Given that the sample includes drug court judges and administrators, presumably very
busy individuals, the amount of time required to complete the instrument may be viewed
as a limitation.
Lastly, the initial mailout of the survey instrument occurred during the month of
December 2006. The final mailing occurred during the third week in January 2007. The
most obvious issue which may have impacted the response rate is the timing. Because
the mailings occurred during the holiday season, factors such as vacations, lack of
motivation and increased mail volume may have negatively impacted the response rate.
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In addition, there is the possibility that, in some cases, judges who were not re-elected
during the November 2006 elections would not have returned after the holidays to receive
the survey. Moreover, if a new judge was recently elected, he or she may not have been
inclined to answer the survey if they had no prior involvement with the drug court
program.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

Survey Responses and Sample Population
Descriptive characteristics of respondents are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Surveys were disseminated to a total of 340 drug court judges and administrators in five
states. One hundred and seventy surveys were disseminated to drug court judges and one
hundred and seventy were disseminated to drug court administrators. Of those 340, 114
judges and administrators completed and returned the survey. Thus, the overall response
rate was 33.5%. Of the 114 respondents, 43% indicated that their current position was
drug court judge and 56% indicated that their current position was drug court
administrator. One respondent did not respond to this item. Thus, the response rate for
drug court judges was 29% and 38% for drug court administrators.
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Table 4.1
Respondent Demographics
Variable

N

%

Judge
Administrator
5.27 years
51.18 years

49
64

43.0
56.1

Male
Female

71
40

62.3
35.1

African-American
White
Other

12
96
2

10.5
84.2
1.8

Current Position
Experience (mean)
Age (mean)
Gender
Race

Education
Some High School
High School
Some college or jr.college
degree
Bachelor’s degree
Some graduate school
Graduate degree
Professional degree
Multiple

0
2
8

0
1.8
7.0

25
7
17
49
3

21.9
6.1
14.9
43.0
2.6

0 to 25%
26 to 50%
51 to 75%
76 to 99%
100%

43
18
16
8
29

37.7
15.8
14.0
7.0
25.4

Drug Court Activity

NOTE: Percentages fail to total 100% due the exclusion of non-responses.

Of those participants who completed the items which requested demographic
information, 62% were males and 35% were females. Further, 11% were African
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American, 84% were Caucasian and 2% identified “Other” as their race. The mean age
of the sample was 51 years and the mean number of years in current position was 5.27.
The survey also addressed the respondents’ educational qualifications. The
majority of the respondents (43%) possessed a professional degree (law degree or
LL.M.). Twenty-five (25%) of respondents possessed a bachelor’s degree and 17 (15%)
possessed a graduate degree (M.S., M.A. or Ph.D.). Overall, the sample was welleducated.
Respondents who answered the survey item regarding the number of years in their
current position (n = 107) indicated a range of 1 to 24 years (mean = 5.27 years). Fifty
four percent of respondents indicated drug court duties occupied 50% or less of their
time. Forty-six percent of respondents indicated that drug court duties occupied over
50% of their time, of which 25% indicated that drug court occupied 100% of their time.
The respondents’ employment history also was explored. Of 111 respondents,
32% indicated that the field in which they worked prior to their drug court service was
the judiciary, 1% had served as a law clerk, 5 % served in law enforcement, 12% worked
in the field of community corrections and 4% worked in the business field. Forty-eight
percent of respondents indicated that they worked in “other” fields prior to joining the
drug court program.
A demographic comparison among judges and administrators further profiles the
respondent group. These findings are presented in the following table.
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Table 4.2
Respondent Demographics by Current Position
Variable

Judge
(%)

Administrator
(%)

5.23
53.10

5.30
49.90

Male
Female

72.3
27.7

57.8
42.4

African-American
White
Other

8.7
91.3
0

12.5
84.4
3.1

0
0
0

0
3.1
12.5

Experience (mean)
Age (mean)
Gender

Race

Education
Some High School
High School
Some college or jr.
college degree
Bachelor’s degree
Some graduate
school
Graduate degree
Professional degree
Multiple

2.1
0

37.5
10.9

6.4
87.2
4.3

21.9
12.5
1.6

0 to 25%
26 to 50%
51 to 75%
76 to 99%
100%

69.4
16.3
6.1
0
8.2

12.5
15.6
20.3
12.5
39.1

Drug Court Activity
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Table 4.3
Drug Court Program Characteristics
Variable

N

%

7
21
24
44
17

6.2
18.6
21.2
38.9
15.0

Single-County
Two-County District
Three-County District
Four or more

49
16
24
23

43.8
14.3
21.4
20.5

Under 10,000
10,001-25,000
25,001-50,000
50,001-75,000
Over 75,000

1
6
10
15
79

.9
5.4
9.0
13.5
71.2

Felony only
Misdemeanor only
Felony and Misdemeanor
Juvenile only
Other

51
3
20
18
19

45.9
2.7
18.0
16.2
17.1

Diversion, pre-plea
Post-plea
Probation program
Other

20
64
9
21

17.5
56.1
7.9
18.4

Operational Duration
0-1 year
2-3 years
4-5 years
6-10 years
Over 10 years
Number of Counties in District

Population

Jurisdiction

Drug Court Model
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The majority of drug court programs (85%) were reported to have been in
operation between zero and ten years. Forty six percent of programs were operational
between zero and five years with the remaining thirty nine percent in operation between
six and ten years. Fifteen percent of programs were operational over ten years.
The number of counties and population of the judicial district served by the drug
courts also was an area of inquiry. Forty-four percent of respondents indicated that their
drug court program served a single-county district. Thirty-six percent indicated that their
drug court programs served two or three counties while twenty-one percent indicated that
their drug court program served four or more counties. Seventy-one percent of
respondents indicated that the population of the judicial district in which the drug court
operated was over 75,000, while twenty-three percent of respondents indicated that the
judicial district in which the drug court operated had a population of 25,000 to 75,000.
Jurisdiction of the programs also was an area of inquiry. Forty-six percent of
respondents indicated that their programs heard felony cases only, while eighteen percent
of respondents indicated that their programs heard both felony and misdemeanor cases.
Sixteen percent of respondents indicated that their programs heard only juvenile cases.
Seventeen percent of respondents indicated that their program operated in a court with
jurisdiction over “other” types of cases. In most cases, “other” referred to dependency
courts or family court drug courts.
As discussed in Chapter 2, no universal drug court model exists. As such,
respondents were asked which model was utilized in their jurisdiction. The majority of
respondents (56 %) indicated that the drug court program in their jurisdiction was a postplea model. Eighteen percent of respondents indicated that model utilized in their drug
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court program was a diversion model. Twenty-one (18%) respondents indicated that the
model utilized in their jurisdiction was one other than a post-plea, diversion or probation
model.

Table 4.4
Drug Court Client Characteristics
n

%

Less than 25
25-50
51-100
101-200
201-400
401-500
Over 500

8
8
12
18
15
11
39

7.2
7.2
10.8
16.2
13.5
9.9
35.1

Less than 10
10-25
26-50
51-75
76-100
More than 100

61
33
7
5
2
3

55.0
29.7
6.3
4.5
1.8
2.7

Adult Cases
Juvenile Cases
Adult and Juvenile

70
21
23

61.4
18.4
20.2

Variable
Total Clients Served

Monthly Client Intake

Clients
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Drug court programs within the sample appear to be serving a high volume of
clients. Forty percent of respondents indicated that the number of clients served by the
drug court program ranged between 101 and 500 while thirty-five percent of respondents
indicated that the drug court program has served over 500 clients since opening. Twenty
five percent of respondents indicated that their program served between 0 to 100 clients
since its establishment.
Another measure of the number of clients served by drug court programs in this
sample was monthly client intakes. Eighty five percent of respondents reported that the
drug court program completed between 0 and 25 client intakes per month. Eleven
percent of respondents indicated that the drug court program completed between 26 and
75 client intakes per month while only five percent of respondents indicated that the drug
court program completed more than seventy five client intakes per month.
Sixty one percent of respondents in this sample indicated that their drug court
program served adults only, while eighteen percent indicated that their programs served
only a juvenile population. Twenty percent of respondents indicated that their program
served both adult and juvenile populations.
Inquiry also was made into those circumstances which hindered participation by
drug-related offenders. These circumstances were developed from the list of
implementation barriers identified by Lattimore et al. (2005). Respondents were asked to
rank the top three circumstances which hindered participation by offenders in the drug
court program. Stringent eligibility criteria (18%), offenders who decline to participate in
the program (18%) and lack of referrals (14%) were the most common circumstances
identified by respondents as the top circumstance which hindered participation in the
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drug court program. However, eighteen percent of respondents did not identify an issue
in this category. View of the drug court program as too stringent (24%) was the most
common issue identified by respondents as second followed by eligible offenders who
decline to participate in the program (14%). Twenty-six respondents did not identify an
issue. Issues which were most commonly identified by respondents as the third
circumstance which hindered participation included the following: view of the drug court
program as too stringent (12%) and the lack of referrals (11%). Forty-one respondents did
not identify a third issue.
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Table 4.5
Administrative Characteristics of Drug Court Programs
Funding Sources
Grant funds (federal)
Grant funds (state)
Grant funds (local)
Court fees
Federal funds
State funds
Local funds
Private donations
Implementation Actions
Attended training sessions offered
by federal agencies
Attended training sessions offered
by state agencies
Applied for federal grant funds
Applied for state grant funds
Requested technical assistance
(federal)
Requested technical assistance
(state)
Requested assistance from
statewide drug court association
Consulted other drug court judges
Consulted other drug court
Administrators
Attended/observed drug court
sessions
Consulted State Attorney General
Consulted state legislators
Consulted local elected officials
Consulted D.A./Prosecutor
Consulted Public Defender
Consulted local law enforcement
Consulted local probation/parole
Administrators
Consulted local probation/parole
Officers
Consulted local mental health
Administrators
Consulted local mental health agency
staff/counselors
Requested budget increase
Secured additional judgeship
Retained an evaluator
Restructured staff positions
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N
43
36
16
59
11
50
49
26

%
37.7
31.6
14.0
51.8
9.6
43.9
43.0
22.8

94

82.5

98

86.0

89
77
64

78.1
67.5
56.1

74

64.9

73

64.0

107
99

93.9
86.8

97

85.1

19
68
93
103
104
99
101

16.7
59.6
81.6
90.4
91.2
86.8
88.6

101

88.6

91

79.8

91

79.8

77
27
68
86

67.5
23.7
59.6
75.4

The administrative features of drug court programs operated by the respondents
were also of interest in the present study. Respondents also were asked about the actions
they had undertaken to successfully implement their drug court program. In addition to
identification of all actions undertaken, respondents were asked to rank those actions in
terms of importance. Of those who responded to the question, 26% of respondents
indicated that training by federal agencies was the most beneficial action they undertook
to successfully implement the drug court program. Eleven percent of respondents
indicated that applying for federal grant funding was the most beneficial action
undertaken. Eleven percent of respondents identified the second most important action
taken as training by state agencies. Ten percent of respondents indicated that training by
federal agencies and consultation with other drug court judges were the second most
beneficial actions undertaken. Ten percent of respondents identified attendance and
observation of other drug court sessions as the third most beneficial action.
Sources of funding for drug court programs also were explored. Grant funding
was the first area of inquiry. Interestingly, most respondents indicated that federal, state
and local grants were not a source of funding for the drug court programs. Sixty two
percent of respondents indicated that federal grants were not a funding source; sixty eight
percent of respondents indicated that state grants were not a funding source and eighty six
percent of respondents indicated that local grants were not a funding source. Other than
grant funding, funds from government, federal, state and local were explored.
Interestingly, the majority of respondents again indicated that government was not a
source of funding for the drug court program. Ninety percent of respondents indicated
that federal funds were not a funding source; fifty-six percent of respondents indicated
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that state funds were not a funding source and fifty- seven percent of respondents
indicated that local government funds were not a funding source.
Court fees are another popular funding source for drug court programs. However,
the respondents in this study were about equally split with regard to the use of court fees
as a funding source for drug court programs. Forty-eight percent of respondents
indicated that court fees were not a funding source while fifty-two percent indicated that
court fees were a funding source. Private donations also seem to be an uncommon
funding source. Seventy-seven percent of respondents indicated that private donations
were not a funding source while twenty-three percent of respondents indicated that
private donations were a source of drug court funding.
It appears that sources of drug court funding are diverse. Primary funding sources
appear to be state and local funds and court fees with a smaller role for private funding
sources. Fewer respondents indicated that grants were a source of funding. These results
may result from the use of grant funds in the initial phases of program development with
less reliance or availability of grant funding for operational drug courts. However,
because the survey item requested respondents to check all funding sources that applied,
the results in any single category may not adequately reflect the true nature of funding for
drug court programs.
The goals of drug court programs also were also explored. Results are presented
in Table 4.6. Higher reported means indicate a higher degree of perceived importance of
the goal within the drug court program. The range for goals was 0 to 3, thus those goals
with a reported mean which exceeded 2.0 were perceived as important. Seven goals
identified in the survey item exceeded a mean of 2.0. Therefore, all were perceived as
90

important or very important by the respondents. The three goals with the highest
reported means are reduction of recidivism, reduction of drug-related crime and ensuring
that drug-related offenders receive treatment.
Table 4.6
Drug Court Goals
Goals

Mean
2.75
2.69

Standard
Deviation
.053
.059

Reduction of recidivism
Reduction of drug-related
crime
Ensure drug offenders
receive treatment
Reduction of crime
To provide accountability
for drug offenders
To offer correctional
alternatives for drug
offenders
Reduction of cost of drugrelated crime
Reduction of jail/prison
overcrowding
To enhance or facilitate
inter-agency cooperation
To enhance or facilitate
Inter-agency communication
Free up judicial resources

N
114
114

2.67

.054

114

2.62

.059

114

2.55

.057

114

2.44

.071

114

2.03

.080

114

1.79

.089

114

1.75

.083

114

1.70

.082

114

1.58

.103

114

NOTE: Not important=0, Somewhat important=1, Important=2, Very Important=3.

As with implementation actions, respondents were asked to rank in order of
importance the top three goals of the drug court program. Interestingly, very little
variance emerged among the three levels. For the most important goal of the drug court
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program, respondents indicated the following: ensuring treatment for drug-related
offenders (33%), reduction of recidivism (32%) and reduction of crime (13%). For the
second most important goal, respondents indicated the following: reduction of recidivism
(25%), ensuring treatment for drug-related offenders (14%), accountability for drug
related offenders (14%) and reduction of drug-related crime (14%) and lastly, the
reduction of crime in general (13%). The third most important goals of the drug court
programs were as follows: ensure that drug-related offenders receive treatment (16%),
reduction of recidivism (14.0%), accountability of drug-related offenders (12%) and
reduction of drug-related crime (12%).
Dependent Variables
Three dependent variables were utilized in this design. The first dependent
variable is perception of drug court success. This variable represents an overall measure
of the perceptions regarding drug court success. Maynard-Moody et al. (1990) utilized a
five-point scale to operationalize successful program implementation in their examination
of street-level implementation of community corrections programs. This scale asked
respondents to characterize the improvement or deterioration of conditions or services
ranging from low to high. These conditions or services included the following: jail
crowding, probation and parole services, direct treatment services to offenders,
community safety and coordination of the criminal justice system in the county and state.
Given the similarity among the goals of community corrections and drug court programs,
the variable, as operationalized by Maynard-Moody et al., was utilized as the dependent
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variable in the present study. 11 However, additional indicators were included due to the
unique nature of drug court programs. A review of the drug court evaluation literature
reveals three primary indicators of drug court success: lower recidivism rates, higher
treatment retention rates and cost-effectiveness (U.S. GAO, 1995, 1997). These
indicators were added to those identified by Maynard-Moody et al. to form a more
comprehensive list of indicators designed specifically for drug courts.
The dependent variable as measured by the comprehensive list of success
indicators is a five-point scale placed near the beginning of the survey instrument in order
to increase the likelihood of obtaining full and complete responses. This item requested
respondents to characterize the improvement or deterioration of the following conditions
or services following the implementation of a drug court program: jail crowding,
probation services for drug offenders, direct treatment services to drug offenders,
community safety and coordination of the criminal justice system in the county and state,
coordination of service delivery among substance abuse treatment providers and the
judicial system, drug-related crime, recidivism rates of drug court participants, ability of
the drug court program to retain participants and cost-effectiveness.

11

Unlike the present study, Maynard-Moody et al. (1990) utilized successful program implementation as an
independent variable.
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Recidivism of offenders
Time spent in treatment
Payment of fees/fines
Sobriety of offenders
Jail crowding
Successful Implementation of
Drug Courts
Delivery of probation services
Delivery of substance abuse treatment
Inter-agency coordination
Inter-agency cooperation
Public safety
Confidence in criminal justice system
Figure 4.1

Determinants Model of Perceived Successful Implementation of Drug
Courts
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Due to the large number of success indicators, factor analysis was employed in an
effort to identify patterns or constructs. According to Babbie (2000), “[f]actor analysis is
a complex algebraic method used to discover patterns among the variations in values of
several variables” (Babbie, p. 449). Factor analysis has two primary objectives: to group
variables into meaningful constructs and to reduce data (Hair et al., 1998). In the present
study, rotated factor analysis provided some insight into the structure of the variables and
revealed that the variables held together as two unitary constructs with Eigenvalues
greater than 1.00. These factors were also supported by an examination of the skree
diagram (Hair, et al., 1998).
Table 4.7
Results for the Extraction of Component Factors
Factor

Eigenvalue

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

4.598
1.304
.983
.860
.755
.641
.612
.469
.424
.290
.063

Percent of Variance Cumulative Percent
of Variance
41.80
41.804
53.66
11.855
8.933
62.59
7.817
70.41
6.866
77.27
5.829
83.10
5.561
88.66
4.262
92.92
3.858
96.78
2.639
99.42
.575
100.00

Based on logic, substantive meaning and the results of factor analysis, two
constructs were labeled as follows: Offender and Service Delivery (Babbie, 2000). Each
produced an Eigenvalue greater than 1.0 (Table 4.7). The Service Delivery construct
95

(Factor 1) included the following: delivery of probation services, delivery of substance
abuse treatment, inter-agency coordination and inter-agency cooperation. Each of these
indicators relates to the perceived impact of drug court programs upon the delivery of
services by the criminal justice system. This construct had a Cronbach alpha of .810.
The Offender construct (Factor 2) included the following success indicators: recidivism
by offenders, time spent by offenders in treatment, payment of fees and fines by
offenders, sobriety of offenders and jail crowding. 12 These indicators are associated with
the perceived impact of drug courts upon the drug-related offender. This construct had a
Cronbach alpha of .68. While not all factors produced reliability coefficients of .70 or
greater, it is clear that the reliability coefficients factors load in noticeable patterns (Hair,
et al 1998). When these patterns are considered in light of logic and substantive
meaning, the constructs are appropriate.
Ultimately, the Service and Offender factors were combined to produce a Drug
Court Success dependent variable. This variable was intended to capture all aspects of
drug court success and provide an overall indicator.

12

Arguably, a third construct could have been employed given the .983 Eigenvalue for Factor 3. However,
because there was no theoretical or practical association with the other factors, a third construct was not
utilized. In addition, Varimax rotation produced high loadings with these two variables.
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Table 4.8
VARIMAX-Rotated Loadings
Variables
Recidivism by offenders
Time spent in treatment by
offenders
Payment of fees/fines by
offenders
Sobriety of offenders
Jail crowding
Delivery of probation
services
Delivery of substance abuse
treatment
Inter-agency coordination
Inter-agency cooperation
Public safety
Confidence in criminal
justice system
Sum of squares (eigenvalue)
Percentage of trace*

Factor 1

Factor 2

Communality

.172
.256

.714
.561

.54
.38

.196

.589

.38

- .034
.153
.548

.695
.594
-.013

.48
.37
.30

.723

.334

.63

.894
.882
.409
.593

.236
.245
.597
.484

.85
.83
.52
.58

3.070
27.900

2.820
25.600

Total
5.89
53.50

*Trace = sum of eigenvalues

Once dependent variables were identified and constructed, a comparison of
means was completed to determine if a statistical difference existed between the
responses of drug court judges and administrators on the dependent variables.
The results indicate that drug court administrators reported significantly higher means
for two dependent variables. These variables were Drug Court Success and the
Service Delivery dependent variable. Thus, administrators had significantly higher
means than judges (t = -2.088, p < .05) with regard to the dependent variable Drug
Court Success. Administrators also had significantly higher means when compared to
judges with regard to the dependent variable Service Delivery (t = -2.909, p < .05).
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No significant difference existed between the two groups of respondents with regard
to the dependent variable Offender-related success. These results are more fully
reported in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9
Comparison of Means Between Judges and Administrators
Group Statistics
Drug court success
Judge
Administrator
Offender-related success
Judge
Administrator
Service delivery
Judge
Administrator
*p < .05

N

Mean

Std.
Std Error of
Deviation Mean

t

49
64

28.67
30.34

4.14
4.26

.592
.533

-2.088*

49
64

16.16
16.58

2.60
2.64

.372
.331

-.832

49
64

12.51
13.77

2.43
2.14

.348
.268

-2.909*

Note: These three dependent variables are scales derived from indicators that range from a code of “0” for
significant deterioration to “4” for significant improvement.

Independent Variables
Ten independent variables were ultimately utilized in the present study. These
variables included seven demographic variables and three government variables.

Demographics
Demographic variables included the following: current position, years in current
position, age, gender, race, education, and percent of time spent on drug court activities.
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Current position indicated whether the respondent was a judge or administrator. Judges
were coded as “0” and administrators were coded as “1”.
Time spent on drug court activities was also examined. Responses were coded as
follows: 0 = 0-25%, 1 = 26-50%, 2 = 51-75%, 3 = 76-99%, and 4 = 100%. Years in
current position and age were each measured by the actual number of years.
Race was initially operationalized into six categories (African American, Asian or
Pacific Islander, White, non-Hispanic, Native American, Hispanic and Other). However,
for purposes of regression analysis, the original six categories were collapsed into two: 0
= African American (n=12) and 1 = White (n=96) as there were four respondents who did
not respond to this survey item and only two respondents who identified their
race/ethnicity as something other than African American or White. For these six
individuals, these cases were treated as missing data.
Education was operationalized as highest degree obtained. Originally, there were
eight categories. These ranged from some high school, high school graduate, some
college or junior college, bachelor’s degree, some graduate school, graduate degree,
professional degree and multiple degrees. The original categories were collapsed into the
following: 0 = high school or less, 1 = some college or bachelor’s degree, 2 = some
graduate school or graduate degree, 3 = J.D/LL.M. Examination of the means for these
three groups through the use of one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences
among the groups.
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Level of Government
Several variables were operationalized with reference to the level of government
(federal, state or local). Federal and state actors, policies and activities are considered
top-down factors, while local actors, policies and activities are considered bottom-up
factors. A discussion about each independent variable follows.
Three independent variables related to the level of government were ultimately
identified and created (Federal, State and Local). Each of these variables represents the
sum of responses in the following categories: support for implementation of drug courts,
influence on implementation of drug courts, incentives for drug court implementation and
importance of drug courts by level of government. Obstacles to the implementation of
drug courts was subtracted from the equation. In order to better understand the
underlying categories, each will be more fully discussed in the following paragraphs.
The means for these variables are reported in Table 4.10.
Factor analysis was utilized for each of the four variables (support, influence,
incentives and importance) to determine whether three factors (federal, state and local)
emerged. With the exception of incentives, the variables held together as unified
constructs within each level of government with Cronbach alphas of .70 or greater.
Interestingly, incentives emerged as a separate construct within federal and state.

Support for Implementation of Drug Courts
Survey items 13-15 were designed to measure the level of support or resistance to
the implementation of drug court programs by various actors/agency. Survey item 13
asked respondents to characterize the level of support or resistance to drug court
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implementation by government actors at the federal, state and local levels. Common
among all levels of government were the following actors: elected officials, corrections
officials and mental health officials at the federal, state and local levels of government.
Additionally, federal actors included the United States Department of Justice, while state
actors included state attorneys general and appellate court judges. Local actors included
the local judiciary, district attorney, public defender, law enforcement officials, drugrelated offenders and general public. Survey response categories ranged from very
supportive to very resistant. Responses were coded as follows: 0 = very resistant, 1 =
somewhat resistant, 2 = somewhat supportive, 3 = very supportive.
Survey item 14 was an open-ended questions which asked respondents to identify
the actor or agency (from the list provided in survey item 13) which provided the most
support for the implementation of their drug court program. Thereafter, survey item 15
asked respondents to identify the actor or agency which provided the most resistance to
the implementation of their drug court program.

Influence on Implementation of Drug Courts
Survey item 16 asked respondents to characterize the degree of influence
exercised on drug court implementation by various federal, state and local actors (see
previous description of various actors). Survey response categories ranged from no
influence to very influential. Responses were coded as follows: 0 = no influence, 1 =
some influence, 2 = moderate influence, 3 = very influential. Survey item 17 was an
open ended question which asked respondents to identify the actor which exercised the
most influence over the implementation of drug courts.
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Incentives for Drug Court Implementation
Survey item 18 asked respondents to identify whether various incentives for drug
court implementation existed during the development of their drug court program.
Incentives included financial assistance/matching funds, grant funds, State Court
Advisory Board, staff training, technical assistance, MIS, data collection and evaluation
support and lastly, a drug court association. Respondents were asked to check all that
applied. Responses were coded “0” if not present and “1” if present.

Importance of Drug Courts
Survey item 24 asked respondents to characterize the degree to which drug courts
are viewed as important by various federal, state and local actors (see previous
description of various actors). Survey response categories ranged from not important to
very important. Responses were coded as follows: 0 = not important, 1 = somewhat
important, 2 = important and 3 = very important.

Obstacles to Implementation of Drug Courts
Survey item 20 was designed to measure the presence of circumstances which
hindered the implementation of drug court programs. As with other variables, these were
measured by reference to the level of government at which the circumstances existed.
Respondents were asked to check all that applied and indicate if the obstacle was present.
If the obstacle was not present, the response was coded as “0”. If the obstacle was
present, the response was coded as “1”.
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Federal, state and local variables were scaled differently throughout the survey.
As such, Table 4.10, presents the means as standardized percentages in an effort to more
accurately describe the relative influence of each. The means were standardized by
subtotaling each category within the respective level of government. For example, the
means for support, influence, incentives, importance (all positive contributions) were
subtotaled within each level of government. The standardized mean is then divided by
the range for the level of government thereby producing a number which reflects a
positive contribution rate with a maximum contribution of 100%. Next, the mean for
Obstacles which has a negative contribution is divided by the range for that category
within each level of government. This calculation produces a negative contribution rate
with a maximum contribution of 100%. This process allows discussion about the means
between and among the categories within each level of government.
Following calculation, the means between and among the levels of government
may be discussed. Within the federal level government, four variables collectively yield
a positive contribution rate of 37%. Those same variables collectively produced a
positive contribution rate of 55% on the state level. Those variables produced a positive
contribution rate of 65% on the local level. Interestingly, the greatest positive
contribution rate is evident on the local level.
Examination of the negative contribution rate yields similar findings. On the
federal level, a negative contribution rate of 5% exists. On the state level, the negative
contribution rate was 12%. Lastly, obstacles produced a negative contribution rate of
20% on the local level.
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Overall, contributions and obstacles yield the highest percentages on the local
level. These results suggest that positive and negative conditions or influences upon drug
court programs are most closely associated with the local level of government or at least
more easily attributed to local conditions and actors. The more remote the level of
government or its actors, the less likely it is that drug court personnel will attribute either
positive or negative influences.
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Table 4.10
Federal, State and Local Variables
Variable (Range)
Federal

N

Mean

S.E.

Std. Deviation

(0-40)

114

14.09

.630

6.72

Support (0-12)
Influence (0-12)
Incentives (0-7)
Importance (0-9)

114
114
114
114

6.41
2.94
2.35
3.17

.107
.292
.180
.231

1.15
3.11
1.92
2.46

Subtotal

14.87
114

.78

.183

1.95

(0-61)

114

31.89

1.09

11.65

Support
(0-18)
Influence (0-18)
Incentives (0-7)
Importance (0-18)

114
114
114
114

13.69
7.90
2.50
9.57

.259
.475
.209
.436

2.76
5.07
2.23
4.66

Obstacles (0-15)
State

Subtotal

33.66

Obstacles (0-15)

114

1.78

.248

2.65

Local

(0-88)

114

53.96

1.36

14.54

Support
(0-27)
Influence (0-27)
Incentives (0-7)
Importance (0-27)

114
114
114
114

22.32
16.34
.97
17.28

114

56.91

Subtotal

2.95

Obstacles (0-15)

105

.319
.632
.132
.552

3.40
6.75
1.41
5.89

.320

3.42

CHAPTER V
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Multiple regression analysis was utilized in order to examine the influence of
federal, state and local variables and certain demographics upon the successful
implementation of drug court programs. Multiple regression analysis is appropriate when
there is a single dependent variable measured at interval or ratio level and multiple
independent variables are present (Hair, et al.1998). The objective is to determine if the
independent variables can be used to predict the dependent variable’s value.
The multiple regression models presented in this chapter assume that each level of
government is unidimensional. As discussed in the preceding chapter, factor analysis
was utilized for each of the four variables (support, influence, incentives and importance)
to determine whether three factors (federal, state and local) emerged. With the exception
of incentives, the variables held together as unified constructs within each level of
government with each having a Cronbach alpha greater than .70. Interestingly, incentives
emerged as a separate construct within the federal and state variables.

Model 1
The first model was designed to examine the impact of several independent
variables upon the perception of drug court success by drug court judges and
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administrators. Multivariate regression was utilized because ratio-level data was collected
for the dependent variable.
In the formula: Ŷ = α + β1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 +
β8X8 + β9X9 + β10X10 + ε, Ŷ represents the perception of drug court success. β1 through
β10 are slope weights for the ten independent variables and ε represents the measurement
error in the Y variable, which in OLS, is assumed to equal zero. X1 represents federal
factors, X2 represents state factors, and X3 represents local factors, X4 represents current
position, X5 represents years in current position, X6 represents age, X7 represents gender,
X8 represents race, X9 represents highest educational level and X10 represents percentage
of time spent on drug court activities as discussed in Chapter 3. Table 5.1 presents the
descriptive statistics for the variables associated with Model 1.

Table 5.1
Descriptive Statistics for Model 1 Variables
Variable
Success of
DC
Federal
State
Local
Yrs in
Position
Age
Education
Drug Court
Activity

Mean
29.54

Std Deviation
4.29

Minimum
0

Maximum
36

n
110

14.09
31.89
53.96

6.72
11.65
14.54

0
0
0

40
61
88

110
110
110

5.27
51.18
2.12
1.67

3.920
9.250
.909
1.633

1
29
0
0

24
74
3
4

110
110
110
110

107

Based on the means presented in Table 5.1, drug court judges and administrators
perceive success of drug court programs to be extremely high with a mean of 29.54. On
a scale with 36 as a maximum, the Success dependent variable is above average at 82 %.
As previously discussed in Chapter 4, examination of the federal, state and local
independent variables suggests that judges and administrators attribute the most
importance or influence to local actors and agencies (61%) followed by state actors or
agencies (52%) and federal actors and agencies (35%).
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Table 5.2
Correlation Matrix for Model 1 Variables
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DV
Federal
State
Local
Position
Yrs in
Position
Age
Gender
Race
Educ
DCt
Activity

DV
1.000

1
*

.077
.032
- .026
- .004
-.269
.281

**
**

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.000
.700**
-.116
.168
-.050

1.000
-.020
.273 **
-.176

1.000
.015
.006

1.000
-.585**

1.000

1.000
**

**

.186
.315 **
- .091
.240

2

.691
.489
.010
.012

**

**

- .100
.621
- .110

.018
.063
- .108
- .275
.129

1.000

**

1.000
.047
-.102

1.000
.361

.130
.020
- .033
- .175

.119
.021
.012
- .124

.158

.116

.386 **
.564
- .066
-.715 **
-.066

**

1.000

**

.433 **
.631 **
-.084
-.070
-.004

*p<.05 level (2-tailed); **p<.01 level (2-tailed)
n=110

NOTE: DV – Success of Drug Court; X1 – Federal factors; X2 – State factors; X3 – Local factors; X4 – Current Position (0-Judge, 1Administrator); X5 – Years in Current Position (in years); X6 – Age(in years); X7 – Gender (0=Male, 1=Female); X8 – Race (0 =
African American, 1 = Caucasian); X9 – Education (measured by highest degree obtained, 0 = High School or less, 1 = Bachelor’s
Degree or Some college, 2 = Graduate Degree or Some graduate school, 3 = J.D./LL.M); X10 – Drug Court Activity (measured by
percentage of time devoted to drug court Activities, 0 = 0-25%, 1 = 26-50%, 2 = 51-75%, 3 = 76-99%, 4 = 100%).
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As reflected in Table 5.2, five independent variables are statistically significant
with regard to the dependent variable. These include Federal, State, Local, Education
and Drug Court Activity. However, when using a benchmark of .40, none of these is
reasonably strong.
Multicollinearity exists when an independent variable is highly correlated with
two or more independent variables (Hair, 1998). When high levels of correlation occur
among independent variables, it becomes difficult to determine the impact of each
variable upon the dependent variable (Babbie, 2001; Hair, 1998; Bachman & Paternoster,
1997). Based on the examination of the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the
correlation matrix, there are no multicollinearity problems.

Table 5.3
Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis For Variables Predicting the Success of
Drug Courts
T
8.221*

Tolerance
.

VIF

-.131
.304
.116
.055

-.978
2.074*
.959
.380

.459
.380
.563
.392

2.181
2.633
1.778
2.551

.022

.150

1.583

.914

1.094

.001
.858
1.310
.686
.324

.038
-.051
.056
-.150
.097

.374
-.521
.600
- 1.023
.773

.786
.869
.934
.382
.518

1.272
1.151
1.070
2.619
1.929

Variable
Constant

B
25.455

SE
3.096

Federal
State
Local
Current
Position
Yrs
Position
Age
Gender
Race
Educ
DCt
Activity

-.082
.112
.033
.473

.083
.054
.035
1.245

.035
.001
-.447
.787
-.702
.251

Beta

Note: R2 = .216 and F = 2.651; *p < .05
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A multivariate regression analysis (Table 5.3) was completed to examine how
well the independent variables predicted the perception about drug court success. The
linear combination of federal, state, local and demographic variables indicated a
statistically significant relationship to the perception of drug court success.
This model demonstrated that there was a positive, statistically significant
relationship between state factors and the perception about drug court success. For this
sample, a one unit increase in the perception of involvement by state actors caused a .112
increase in the perception of drug court success. The model explains 22% (R2 = .216 ) of
the variance in the dependent variable. Further, for this sample, local and federal factors
were not identified as significantly related to drug court success.
Local factors, current position, years in current position, age and percentage of
time devoted to drug court activities had a positive impact on the perception of drug court
success, but were not statistically significant. Positive impacts were also detected for
administrators and whites, but once again these were not significant. Conversely, there is
a negative relationship between federal actors and the perception of drug court success, as
there is also for females and those respondents with graduate/professional degrees.
Again, however, the contributions are insignificant statistically.

Model 2
Model 2 was designed to examine the impact of several independent variables
upon the perception of offender-related drug court success. As stated earlier, multivariate
regression was utilized because ratio-level data was collected for the dependent variable.
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Coding for the ten independent variables remains unchanged from Model 1. Table 5.4
provides the descriptive statistics for the variables associated with Model 2.
Table 5.4
Descriptive Statistics for Model 2 Variables
Variable
OffenderRelated DC
Success
Federal
State
Local
Yrs in
Position
Age
Education
Drug Court
Activity

Mean
16.36

Std Deviation
2.67

Minimum
0

Maximum
20

N
110

14.09
31.89
53.96

6.72
11.65
14.54

0
0
0

40
61
88

110
110
110

5.27
51.18
2.12

3.92
9.25
.909

1
29
0

24
74
3

110
110
110

1.67

1.633

0

4

110

Based on the means presented in Table 5.4, drug court judges and administrators
perceive offender-related success of drug court programs to be extremely high with a
mean of 16.36. On a scale with 20 as a maximum, this dependent variable is above
average at 82 %. In addition, as previously discussed in Chapter 4, examination of the
federal, state and local independent variables suggests that judges and administrators
attribute the most importance or influence to local actors and agencies (61%) followed by
state actors or agencies (52%) and federal actors and agencies (35%).
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Table 5.5
Correlation Matrix for Model 2 Variables
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DV
Federal
State
Local
Position
Yrs in
Position
Age
Gender
Race
Educ
DCt
Activity

DV
1.000

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.000
.700 **
-.116
.029
-.050

1.000
-.020
.231
-.176

1.000
-.217*
.006

1.000
-.218*

1.000

1.000
.128
.238 *
.197
-.010
.058

**

.116
.016
.030
- .188*
.214

*

.691
.489
.010
.012

**
**

.018
.063
-.108
-.117
.129

1.000
**

.621
-.100
-.110
.130
.020
-.033
-.079
.158

1.000
.047
-.102

1.000
.361

.119
.021
.012
-.150
.116

.386
.564
-.066
-.180
-.066

**
**
**

1.000
.433
.631
-.084
-.027
-.004

**
**

*p<.05 level (2-tailed); **p<.01 level (2-tailed)
n=110

NOTE: DV – Offender-Related Success; X1 – Federal factors; X2 – State factors; X3 – Local factors; X4 – Current Position (0Judge, 1-Administrator); X5 – Years in Current Position (in years); X6 – Age(in years); X7 – Gender (0=Male, 1=Female); X8 –
Race (0 = African American, 1 = Caucasian); X9 – Education (measured by highest degree obtained, 0 = High School or less, 1 =
Bachelor’s Degree or Some college, 2 = Graduate Degree or Some graduate school, 3 = J.D./LL.M.); X10 – Drug Court Activity
(measured by percentage of time devoted to drug court Activities, 0 = 0-25%, 1 = 26-50%, 2 = 51-75%, 3 = 76-99%, 4 = 100%).
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As reflected in Table 5.5, four independent variables are statistically significant with
regard to the dependent variable. These include State, Local, Education and Drug Court
Activity. However, when using a benchmark of .40, none of these is reasonably strong.
Multicollinearity was again assessed by reference to the Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF). Based on the results in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 there again appears to be no problems
with multicollinearity.

Table 5.6
Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting the Success of
Offender-Related Measures
Variable
Constant

B
14.348

SE
1.673

Beta

T
8.577*

Tolerance

VIF

Federal
State
Local
Current
Position
Yrs
Position
Age
Gender
Race
Educ
DCt
Activity

-.032
.048
.015
.074

.054
.035
.022
.668

-.084
.212
.083
.014

-.599
1.379
.653
.111

.459
.377
.558
.560

2.180
2.654
1.791
1.786

.012

.014

.082

.827

.914

1.094

.001
.187
.422
-.482
.247

.001
.557
.866
.357
.200

.089
.034
.049
-.140
.156

.841
.335
.487
-1.348
1.236

.793
.849
.882
.831
.563

1.261
1.178
1.134
1.203
1.777

Note: R2 = .143 and F = 1.598
*p < .05
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A multivariate regression analysis (Table 5.6) was completed to examine how
well the independent variables (federal, state, local and demographics) predicted the
perception of offender-related indicators of drug court success. The linear combination of
the independent variables did not display a statistically significant relationship to the
perception about offender-related indicators of drug court success. The entire model only
explains 14.3 % (R2 = .143) of the variance in the dependent variable.
As expected, none of the independent variables in Model 2 achieved statistical
significance. As such, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, the results of
Model 2 are similar to those found in Model 1 where state and local factors have a
positive impact on the perception of offender-related indicators of drug court success and
federal factors have a negative impact. Again, graduate/professional education was
negatively related to the perception of offender-related indicators of drug court success.
However, unlike Model 1, females becomes positive in this model.

Model 3
Model 3 was designed to examine the impact of several independent variables
upon the perception of service delivery by the criminal justice system. Multivariate
regression was utilized because ratio-level data was collected for the dependent variable.
Coding for the independent variables remains unchanged. Table 5.7 provides descriptive
statistics for the variables associated with Model 3.
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Table 5.7
Descriptive Statistics for Model 3 Variables
Variable

Mean

SystemRelated DC
Success
Federal
State
Local
Yrs in
Position
Age
Education
Drug Court
Activity

13.18
14.09
31.89
53.96
5.27
51.18
2.12
1.67

Std
Deviation
2.36

Minimum

6.72
11.65
14.54
3.92
9.25
.909
1.633

Maximum

N

0

16

110

0
0
0
1

40
61
88
24

110
110
110
110

29
0
0

74
3
4

110
110
110

Based on the means presented in Table 5.7, drug court judges and administrators
perceive system-related success of drug court programs to be extremely high with a mean
of 13.18. On a scale with 16 as a maximum, this dependent variable is above average at
82 %. In addition, as previously discussed in Chapter 4, examination of the federal, state
and local independent variables suggests that judges and administrators attribute the most
importance or influence to local actors and agencies (61%) followed by state actors or
agencies (52%) and federal actors and agencies (35%).
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Table 5.8
Correlation Matrix for Model 3 Variables
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DV
Federal
State
Local
Position
Yrs in
Position
Age
Gender
Race
Educ
DCt
Activity

DV
1.000

1
*

-.070
-.065
-.040
-.280
.272

**

.691
.489
.010
.012

**

*

-.275
.129

1.000
.621 **
-.100
-.110
.130
.020

.018
.063
-.108
**

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.000
-.020
.273 **
-.176

1.000
.015
.006

1.000
-.585**

1.000

1.000

**

.195
.307 *
.217
-.152
.075

2

**

1.000
.047
-.102

-.033
-.175

.119
.021
.012
-.124

.158

.116

1.000
.361 **

1.000

.386 **
.564 **
-.066
-.715 **
-.066

.433 **
.631 **
-.084
-.070
-.004

1.000
.700 **
-.116
.168
-.050

*p<.05 level (2-tailed); **p<.01 level (2-tailed)
n=110

NOTE: DV – Service-Related Success of Drug Court; X1 – Federal factors; X2 – State factors; X3 – Local factors; X4 – Current
Position (0-Judge, 1-Administrator); X5 – Years in Current Position (in years); X6 – Age(in years); X7 – Gender (0=Male,
1=Female); X8 – Race (0 = African American, 1 = Caucasian); X9 – Education (measured by highest degree obtained, 0 = High
School or less, 1 = Bachelor’s Degree or Some college, 2 = Graduate Degree or Some graduate school, 3 = J.D./LL.M.); X10 –
Drug Court Activity (measured by percentage of time devoted to drug court Activities, 0 = 0-25%, 1 = 26-50%, 2 = 51-75%, 3 =
76-99%, 4 = 100%).
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As reflected in Table 5.8, five independent variables are statistically significant with
regard to the dependent variable. These include Federal, State, Local, Education and
Drug Court Activity. However, when using a benchmark of .40, none of these is
reasonably strong.
Based on the results in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 there again appears to be no
multicollinearity problems.
Table 5.9
Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting the
Success of System-Related Measures
Variable
Constant
Federal
State
Local
Current
Position
Yrs
Position
Age
Gender
Race
Educ
DCt
Activity

Tolerance

VIF

-.144
.334
.109
.186

t
6.244*
- 1.092
2.302*
.912
1.302

.459
.380
.563
.392

2.181
2.633
1.778
2.551

.012

.178

1.904

.914

1.094

.001
.470
.718
.376
.178

-.052
-.118
.019
-.058
.039

-.512
- 1.234
.203
-.400
.316

.786
.869
.934
.382
.518

1.272
1.151
1.070
2.619
1.929

B
10.591
-.050
.068
.017
.889

SE
1.673
.046
.029
.019
.682

.023
.000
- .580
.145
- .150
.056

Beta

Note: R2 = .234 and F = 2.930
*p < .05

A multivariate regression analysis (Table 5.9) was completed to examine how
well the independent variables predicted the perception about service-related drug court
success. The linear combination of federal, state and local (and various demographic
variables) indicated a statistically significant relationship to the perception about system118

related drug court success. Thus, it is unlikely that the results of the model are
attributable to chance alone. The model explains 23.4 % (R2 = .234) of the variance in the
dependent variable.
This model demonstrated that there was a positive, statistically significant
relationship between state factors and the perception of system-related drug court
success. Thus, for this sample, a one unit increase in state factors caused a .068 increase
in the perception of system-related drug court success. As with preceding models,
neither local nor federal factors were identified as significantly related to drug court
success. Again, federal factors were negatively related to the perception of systemrelated drug court success. In Model 3, no demographic variable was significantly
related to system-related drug court success, although number of years in current position
approached statistical significance (.060).
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
A review of the available literature suggests that drug court programs are an
innovative tool for use with drug-related offenders in the justice system. Impact and
process evaluations reveal that, overall, drug court programs decrease recidivism,
increase treatment retention and are a cost-effective alternative to incarceration.
However, there has been very little research which has specifically examined those
factors which have influenced the implementation of drug courts. The present study
attempts to fill the existing gap in the literature and begin the discussion regarding the
implementation of drug court programs. More specifically, this study examined
implementation of drug court programs from a top-down and bottom-up perspective.

Summary
The present study provides an interesting picture of drug court judges and
administrators. The majority of respondents were drug court administrators (56 %)
followed by drug court judges (43%). Such response was anticipated given the demands
upon the time of judges. However, while judges did not constitute the majority of the
respondents, there is satisfactory representation of administrators and judges. The group
also appears to be well-educated with 43% of the respondents indicating that they possess
a professional degree such as a J.D. or LL.M. Forty-three percent of respondents
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indicated that they possessed an education ranging from a bachelor’s degree to a graduate
degree. The sample is also characterized by varying levels of experience with drug court
programs. Respondents indicated that they had served in their current position between
one and twenty four years. Thus, the sample ultimately included a range of experience
from those who were relatively new to the field to those with more than two decades of
experience.
The study also yielded some interesting findings regarding the drug court
programs included in the sample. Most programs (85%) in the present study were in
operation between zero and ten years. In addition, most drug court programs in the
present sample served one to three counties (80%) in their respective judicial districts.
Drug court programs in the present sample were also serving judicial districts which were
fairly well-populated with 71% of the respondents indicating that their program served a
district with a population in excess of 75,000.
Jurisdiction of drug court programs was also addressed and was diverse as well.
Courts that heard felony cases only represented the largest singular group within the
sample. However, programs which heard misdemeanor, juvenile and dependency cases
were also included in the sample. The majority of the respondents indicated that their
drug court program served only adult clients (61%) while 18% of respondents indicated
that their programs served only juvenile clients. Thus, respondents possessed a wide
range of jurisdictional expertise. Moreover, the volume of cases processed through the
drug court programs in the sample was impressive. Forty percent of respondents
indicated that their programs had served between 101 and 500 clients since the inception
of the program while another 35% of respondents indicated that their program had served
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in excess of 500 clients since opening. Thus, demographically speaking, the present
sample provided a diverse and experienced group of respondents from which to measure
perceptions of implementation issues.
An area of initial inquiry probed the actions that the respondents had undertaken to
implement the drug court program. In addition to identification of those actions,
respondents were asked to rank those actions in terms of importance. The responses to
this inquiry were diverse but are indicative of those actions which respondents perceive
to be most beneficial to the success of their drug court program. Interesting and in
contrast to later findings in the present study was the identification of training by federal
agencies as the most beneficial action undertaken. Others indicated that application for
federal grant funding was the most beneficial action. Respondents identified the second
most important action taken as training by state agencies, training by federal agencies and
consultation with other drug court judges. The most common response to the request to
identify the third most beneficial action was attendance and observation of other drug
court sessions. Overall, respondents seemed to view training and funding provided by
federal and state agencies as important factors in the successful implementation of their
drug court. The second trend which emerges is the value that is placed upon consultation
with and observance of other drug court programs. Thus, respondents seem to indicate
that the availability of funding, training and consultation with other programs are
important actions during the implementation of a drug court program.
The indication that federal funding is an important action is in contrast to the
responses to the more specific question regarding funding sources of drug court
programs. Interestingly, most respondents indicated that federal, state or local grants
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were not a funding source. Respondents also indicated that government funding, other
than grants, was not a funding source for drug courts. Private donations were not
commonly identified as a funding source either. The respondents were about equally
split on the use of court fees as a funding source for drug court programs. This area of
inquiry raises as many questions as it answers and does not provide a clear picture
regarding the funding of drug court programs. However, it may be that drug court
programs are funded primarily from a combination of existing budgets and court fees.
Clearly-defined and well-understood goals are an important element for the
successful implementation of any program. According to the National Drug Court
Institute (2004) drug court share common goals. These are as follows: to decrease
criminal recidivism; to provide cost-effective intervention with drug offenders; to
concentrate expertise about drug cases into a single courtroom; to increase retention in
drug treatment through judicial supervision and sanction; and to provide drug-involved
offenders with the opportunity for affordable treatment; to address other needs of druginvolved offenders through clinical assessment and effective case management; and
lastly, to “free up” judicial, prosecutorial and defense resources for other types of cases.
Thus, the present study sought to determine whether the goals identified by drug court
judges and administrators in the sample were consistent with those identified by the
National Drug Court Institute.
Respondents were specifically requested to identify the three most important goals
of the drug court program. Interestingly, very little variance emerged among the three
levels. Among the three most important goals, respondents consistently identified the
following: ensuring treatment for drug-related offenders, reduction of recidivism,
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reduction of crime, accountability for drug-related offenders and reduction of drugrelated crime. While no hierarchy exists among those goals identified by the National
Drug Court Institute, respondents in the present study consistently demonstrated an
appreciation of the core goals of a drug court program.
Multiple regression analysis was utilized to further examine the relationships
among the top-down and bottom-up factors and the perceived success of the drug court
program. The use of factor analysis revealed that certain elements of the dependent
variable held together as unitary constructs. Thus, these constructs were addressed
separately.
In the first model (Model 1), the impact of federal, state and local factors as well as
a variety of demographic variables upon the perception of drug court success was
estimated. The model was statistically significant. Examination of the impact of
individual independent variables yielded interesting results. State and local variables
were positively associated with the perception of drug court success, however, federal
variables were negatively associated with the same.
The only variable which had a statistically significant relationship with the
perception of drug court success was state factors. No demographic variable achieved
statistical significance, however, males and graduate and professional education were
negatively related to the perception of drug court success. All other demographics
(current position as administrator, years in current position, age, whites, and percentage
of time devoted to drug court activities) were positively related to the perception of drug
court success.
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In the second model (Model 2), the impact of federal, state, local and demographic
variables upon the perception of offender-related drug court success was estimated. The
model did not achieve statistical significance. However, for the purposes of exploration,
analysis continued. As with Model 1, state and local variables maintained positive
relationships with the dependent variable, but state factors lost statistical significance.
Similarly, federal factors remained negative and insignificant. With the exception of
education, all other demographic variables were positively associated with the dependent
variable. As expected, no independent variable was statistically significant.
In the third model (Model 3), the impact of federal, state, local and demographic
variables upon the perception of service-related drug court success was estimated. As
with the first model, this model achieved statistical significance. Again, state and local
variables maintained positive relationships and state regained its significance. Federal is
again negative and insignificant. Graduate and professional degrees and females are
negatively associated with the dependent variable, while all other demographic variables
are positive.

Implications and Conclusions
The results of the analysis reveal several trends. First, among all models, state
and local variables are positively related to the dependent variable. One explanation for
these results may be the sheer proximity between drug court personnel and state and local
actors. If a drug court is successful, drug court personnel may be more likely to attribute
the success to those government actors with whom the drug court personnel interact on a
more frequent basis. Given the consistently positive relationship between state and local
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variables and the perception of drug court success, it appears that drug court personnel
view state and local actors as those responsible for the success of their drug courts.
This finding, however, lends support to those who advocate for a bottom-up
perspective when evaluating the implementation of public policy. Bottom-up approaches
focus on the actions of street-level actors and the impact those individuals and their
beliefs, goals and activities have on policy implementation. According to Matland
(1995), “…bottom-uppers have placed more emphasis on describing what factors have
caused difficulty [or facilitate] in reaching stated goals” (Matland, 1995, p. 149). Thus,
the fact that local variables have a consistent and positive influence among all of the
models lends some credence to a bottom-up approach. However, the state variables are
also consistently positive and are also the only variable to achieve statistical significance
(Model 1 and Model 3). For purposes of the present study, state variables were
characterized as top-down. As such, the relationships which emerge from the present
study appear to support a blended-approach which ignores neither top-down or bottom-up
factors.
Second, in all models, the federal variable is negatively related to the dependent
variable. Where federal actors and policies are concerned there is a negative impact on
the perceived success of drug courts. This, too, may represent the perception of drug
court personnel that the federal government is more remote and therefore not as
influential on drug court success as state and local actors. It may be more of a challenge
to attribute drug court success to federal actors. Interestingly, however, are the responses
which indicated that participation in federal training and application for federal grant
funding were important actions undertaken to successfully implement the drug court
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program. However, perhaps the implication of these results lies in the fact that once the
federal grant funding is received and the drug court program is implemented, successful
implementation of the program is thereafter more closely associated with state and local
actors. Additionally, while the consistent negative relationship among federal factors and
the perception of drug court success in the present study does not necessarily impugn the
top-down perspective, the results certainly warrant further exploration.
Third, of all independent variables, only the state independent variable has a
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. Moreover, this
statistically significant relationship only exists in two models. As discussed earlier, this
relationship occurs in the full model and the third model which utilizes the system-related
dependent variable. Although no data were collected, this result may be attributable to
the important role of state judicial administration agencies also known as AOC
(Administrative Office of Courts). In those states included in the study, the AOC
provides technical and funding assistance with the initial implementation of drug courts
and thereafter oversees the operation of drug court programs throughout the state. While
AOCs are not involved in the daily administration of drug courts, interviews conducted in
preparation for this research revealed that the AOCs tend to be viewed in a very positive
light. In many states, the AOC is considered to be an advocate for the existence of drug
court programs and is often the liaison between the drug court programs and the
Legislature.
The present study revealed interesting information regarding the implementation of
drug court programs. A host of factors appear to influence the implementation of drug
court programs, including federal, state and local factors. Respondents consistently
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identified state and local actors as being the most supportive and influential of the efforts
to create and implement drug courts. Of those, the most common actors were public
defenders and the district attorneys. If opposition to drug courts existed, the respondents
indicated that local law enforcement or the general public were generally the sources of
the opposition. In addition, there is clearly a more positive view of the influence of state
and local actors when compared to their federal counterparts.
From a policy perspective, the results of the present study reveal that innovative
programs for criminal offenders can thrive in conservative states. Four states in the
sample are southern states. Utah is the only state outside the south which was included.
However, it too, it considered to be conservative in terms of social policy and political
values. Despite the conservative character of these states, drug court programs appear to
be alive and well. Moreover, actors and agencies within these states appear supportive of
innovative programming within the criminal justice system which is markedly different
from the traditional approaches supported by conservatives.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
In order to further explore the issues which attend the implementation of drug court
programs, additional research is necessary. While the present study is a beginning, much
work remains. A review of the limitations of the present study reveals much of the work
for future research. In the future, efforts should be made to expand the study to include a
greater number of drug court programs throughout the country. Inclusion of additional
programs will increase the sample size and provide greater geographic representation.
This would also allow comparison among geographic regions.
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Other methodological modifications could be made to enhance the response rate.
For example, further refinement of the survey instrument should be contemplated to
determine if the instrument may be shortened. In addition, future mailings should not
occur during or immediately following holiday periods.
Future research should identify the exact manner in which the various actors impact
the success of drug court programs. In addition to seven demographic variables, the
present study utilized three government variables (Federal, State and Local) which
represented the sum of responses in the following categories: support for drug court
programs, influence on drug court programs, incentives for implementation of drug court
programs, and perceived importance of drug courts by level of government. Obstacles to
the implementation of drug courts was subtracted from the equation.
Thus, while the present study presents an overall view of the impact of federal, state
and local influences, future research should attempt to more specifically identify the
exact actions (or lack thereof) by various actors. The actions of various actors in the
following categories should be analyzed and presented: support for drug court programs,
influence on drug court programs, incentives for implementation of drug court programs,
perceived importance of drug courts by level of government and obstacles to the
implementation of drug courts.
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Instructions: Please answer the following questions.
PLEASE CIRCLE YOUR RESPONSE.
1.

How long has your drug court been operational?
a. 0-1 year
b. 2-3 years
c. 4-5 years

2.

Approximately how many clients has your drug court program served since
opening?
a.
b.
c.
d.

3.

d. 6-10 years
e. More than 10 years

Less than 25
25 to 50
51 to 100
101-200

e. 201-400
f. 401-500
g. More than 500

Approximately how many client intakes does your program perform per month?
a. Less than 10
b. 10 to 25
c. 26 to 50

4.

d. 51 to 75
e. 76 to 100
f. More than 100

What does your client base consist of?
a. Adult cases only
b. Juvenile cases only
c. Adult and Juvenile cases

5.

Of the following, which best characterizes the drug court model in use in your
jurisdiction?
a.
b.
c.
d.

6.

Diversion, pre-plea
Post-plea
Probation program
Other: ___________

Generally speaking, what percentage of your time is devoted to drug court activities as
opposed to other court responsibilities?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

0-25%
26-50%
51-75%
76-99%
100%
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7. Please indicate the degree to which the implementation of drug court programming has
resulted in the improvement or deterioration of the following conditions or services in your
jurisdiction.
Significant
Deterioration

Some
Deterioration

No Change

Some
Improvement

Significant
Improvement

Recidivism by
offenders
Time spent by
offenders in treatment
Payment of fees/fines
by offenders
Sobriety of offenders
Jail crowding
Delivery of probation
services
Delivery of substance
abuse treatment
Inter-agency
coordination
Inter-agency
cooperation
Public safety
Confidence in the
criminal justice system
8. Of those conditions or services listed in survey item # 6 please indicate which condition or
service has improved the most due to the implementation of your drug court program. Identify
only one. ____________________________________
9. Of those conditions or services listed in survey item # 6, please indicate which condition or
service has deteriorated the most due to the implementation of your drug court program.
Identify only one. ____________________________________
10.

Please identify all sources of funding utilized in the operation of your drug court
program. Check all that apply.
____Grant funds (federal)
____Grant funds (state)
____Grant funds (local)
____Court fees

____Federal funds
____State funds
____Local funds
____Private donations
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11.

Please characterize the level of importance of the following goals within your drug court
program.
Not important

Somewhat
important

Important

Very
Important

Reduction of jail/prison
overcrowding
Reduction of recidivism
Reduction of crime
Reduction of drug-related crime
To reduce the costs associated
with processing and incarceration
of drug offenders
To enhance or facilitate interagency communication
To enhance or facilitate interagency cooperation
To provide accountability for drug
offenders
To offer correctional alternatives
for drug offenders
To insure that drug offenders
receive treatment
To “free up” judicial resources for
other cases

12.

Of those goals listed in survey item # 11, please identify the top three goals of
your drug court program.
Most important goal:
Second most important goal:
Third most important goal:

13.

__________________________
__________________________
__________________________

Please characterize the level of support for or resistance to the implementation of drug
court programs in your jurisdiction by the following actors.
Very
supportive

Somewhat
supportive

Federal elected officials
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal corrections officials
Federal mental health officials
State elected officials
State Attorney General
State corrections officials
State mental health officials
Appellate court judges
State judicial administration
agency
Local elected officials
Local judiciary
District Attorney/Prosecutor

144

Somewhat
Resistant

Very
Resistant

Very
supportive

Somewhat
supportive

Somewhat
Resistant

Very
Resistant

Public Defender/Defense Bar
Local law enforcement officials
Local corrections officials
Local mental health agencies &
staff
Drug-related offenders
General Public

14. Of those actors listed in Question # 13, please identify the actor which provided the most
support for the implementation of your drug court program. Identify only one.
________________________________________________________________________
15. Of those actors listed in Question # 13, please identify the actor which exhibited the most
resistance to the implementation of your drug court program. Identify only one.
________________________________________________________________________
16. Please characterize the degree of influence by the following actors over the implementation
of drug courts in your state.
No influence

Some
influence

Moderate
Influence

Very
influential

Federal elected officials
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal corrections officials
Federal mental health officials
State elected officials
State Attorney General
State corrections officials
State mental health officials
Appellate court judges
State judicial administration agency
Local elected officials
Local judiciary
District Attorney/Prosecutor
Public Defender/Defense Bar
Local law enforcement
Local corrections officials
Local mental health agencies
Drug-related offenders
General Public

17. Of those actors listed in Question # 16, please identify the actor which exercised the most
influence over the implementation of your drug court program. Identify only one.
________________________________________________________________________
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18. Please indicate whether these incentives were present during the development and
implementation of your drug court program. Check all that apply.
Federal

State

Local

Not
Available

Financial Assistance/Matching funds
Grant funds
State Drug Court Advisory Board
Training for drug court staff
Technical assistance for drug court staff
MIS/Data Collection & Evaluation Support
Existence of drug court association

19. Of those incentives listed in Question # 18, please identify the incentive which was most
important to the development of your drug court program. Identify only one.
________________________________________________________________________
20. Please indicate whether, in your experience, the following circumstances hindered the
implementation of drug court programming in your jurisdiction. Check all that apply.
Federallevel
obstacle

State-level
obstacle

Local-level
obstacle

Not
present

Vague laws
Vague policies and regulations
Conflict with existing agency policies
Lack of political support
Lack of support from agency directors
Lack of funding sources
Poor allocation of available funding
Lack of training for drug court staff
Lack of administrative support
Lack of belief in drug court model
Inter-agency conflict
Lack of inter-agency cooperation
Lack of inter-agency communication
Lack of technical assistance
The belief that “nothing works” with drug
offenders/addicts

21. Of those obstacles listed in Question # 20, please identify the issue/circumstance which
proved most difficult to the implementation of your drug court program. Identify only one.
________________________________________________________________________
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22. Please indicate whether the following circumstances hinder participation by offenders in your
drug court program.
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Eligibility criteria too stringent
Lack of referrals
Lack of eligible participants
Failure to identify potential participants
Eligible offenders decline to participate
Eligible offenders view program as too stringent
Lack of information on potential participants
Lack of adequate screening for potential participants
Lack of qualified staff
Lack of training for drug court team/staff
Staff turnover
Lack of administrative support
Lack of belief in drug court model
Inter-agency conflict
Lack of inter-agency coordination

23. Of those items listed in # 22, please identify the top three issues which hinder participation
by offenders in your drug court program.
1. __________________________
2. __________________________
3. __________________________
24. Please characterize the degree to which you believe drug courts are viewed as important by
the following people or organizations.
Not important
Federal elected officials
Federal corrections officials
Federal mental health officials
State elected officials
State Attorney General
State corrections officials
State mental health officials
Appellate court judges
State judicial administration agency (AOC)
Local elected officials
Local judiciary
District Attorney/Prosecutor
Public Defender/Defense Bar
Local law enforcement
Local corrections officials
Local mental health agencies
Drug-related offenders
General Public
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Somewhat
important

Important

Very
important

25. Please indicate which of the following actions you have taken in an effort to successfully
implement a drug court program.

Yes

No

Attended training sessions offered by federal agencies
Attended training sessions offered by state agencies
Applied for grant funding from federal agencies
Applied for grant funding from state agencies
Requested technical assistance from federal agencies
Requested technical assistance from state agencies
Requested assistance from statewide drug court association
Consulted other drug court judges
Consulted other drug court administrators
Attended/observed drug court sessions in other districts
Consulted State Attorney General
Consulted state legislators
Consulted local elected officials
Consulted District Attorney/Prosecutor
Consulted Public Defender
Consulted local law enforcement administrators
Consulted local probation/parole administrators
Consulted local probation/parole officers
Consulted local mental health agency administrators
Consulted local mental health agency staff/counselors
Requested budget increase
Secured additional judgeship to accommodate drug court
Retained the services of an evaluator
Restructured staff positions to accommodate drug court responsibilities

26. Of those activities listed in survey item # 25 please identify the three most beneficial to the
development of your drug court program.
1. __________________________
2. __________________________
3. __________________________
27.

How many counties are included in your judicial district?
a.
b.
c.
d.

28.

Single-county district
Two-county district
Three-county district
Four or more counties in your district

What is the approximate population of the geographical area within your drug court
district?
a. Under 10,000
b. 10,000 to 25,000
c. 25,001 to 50,000

d. 50,001 to 75,000
e. Over 75,000
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29.

What type of jurisdiction does your drug court have?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

30.

Felony cases only
Misdemeanor cases only
Felony and misdemeanor cases
Juvenile cases only
Other: ___________________

Please identify your current position.
A. Drug court judge
C. Other: _______________

B. Drug court administrator/coordinator

31.

How long (in years) have you served in this position? _____________

32.

In what field did you work before you began working in your current position?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

33.

Judiciary
Judicial assistant
Law clerk (holds J.D.)
Law enforcement
Community corrections (probation, parole, etc….)
Business
Other: _________________________

Which of the following best describes your highest level of education?
A. Some high school
B. High school graduate
C. Some college or junior college graduate
D. Bachelor’s Degree (B.S., B.A.)
E. Some graduate study
F. Graduate Degree (M.S., M.A or Ph.D.)
G. Professional Degree (J.D., LL.M.)
H. Multiple Degrees-Please identify all that you currently possess:
________________________________

34.

What is your gender? _______

35.

What is your race (or ethnic group)?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

African American
Asian or Pacific Islander
White, non-Hispanic
Native American
Hispanic

F. Other: ___________________
36.

Please state the year of your birth? (Example: 1961) _____________
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